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Introduction: A Reversal of Grounds
The title' of this article is an intentional misquotation of Bernal's
Black Athena,2 intended to signal an independent appraisal of the
roots of the so-called Western Legal Tradition. This article is both a
critique of this tradition's "originalism," and of its being a "tradition"
at all, thereby challenging the premises behind new projects of
international cultural governance.
I do not want to plunge into the scholarship originated by
Bernal's work3 nor is my intention to discuss his controversial
theories. My aim is to investigate law and the theories of its origins in
the West. I am interested in the challenge to the Western legal
tradition as a whole, and not merely to particular elements or aspects
of it; and this is manifested above all in a comparison with non-
Western civilizations and non-Western philosophies.4 This effort is
now necessary because recently we have witnessed various efforts to
reconcretize the pillars of this tradition on the basis of the Roman
Law supremacy over all other ancient laws. I see these efforts as
strategies of legitimization of a "Western" supremacy in the field of
law, through the pursuit of genealogies. Genealogies help to define
who we think we are, or would like to think we are. They define an
"us" and a "them," and are an essential mechanism of how identities
are constructed.5 This "tracing back of the roots" is a work of
representation, which occupies a central place in current studies on
culture, especially in the practice of portraying cultures as "others."'6
1. Gaius was a Roman jurist who lived in the middle of the high classical period, from
about 110 to 180 C.E. He was the originator of the institutional scheme by which Roman
Law has been presented for centuries as a well connected and ordered system of law.
Because of his academic approach and importance, all students of Roman Law become
well acquainted with him; so that he can symbolize by his name "the" Roman jurist par
excellence. Gains is in a true sense the architect of Justinian's codification. Justinian calls
him "our own Gains," showing an affection for the teacher who had become every
lawyer's introduction to his subject. See A.M. HONORf, GAIUS (1962); see also Peter
Birks & Grant McLeod, Introduction to JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES 16 (Peter Birks & Grant
McLeod trans., Duckworth 1987).
2. 1 MARTIN BERNAL, BLACK ATHENA: THE AFROASIATIC ROOTS OF CLASSICAL
CIVILIZATION (1987).
3. See, e.g., BLACK ATHENA REVISITED (Mary R Lefkowitz & Guy MacLean
Rogers eds., 1996).
4. See also HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 33 (1983).
5. For a discussion of the role of historical legacies in defining social identities, see
BEVERLEY SKEGGS, FORMATIONS OF CLASS AND GENDER: BECOMING RESPECTABLE
(1997). See also David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism
and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 515,536.
6. CuLTURAL REPRESENTATIONS AND SIGNIFYING PRACTICES (Stuart Hall ed.,
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Thus the "Western root" of modem law becomes an issue. If the
genealogical "tree of Western civilization were shown to have roots in
the soils of many different lands, a vision of it as a pluralistic, diverse,
multiethnic, and multicultural society might be legitimated."'7 But
the strategy of exclusion of non-Europeans from the foundation of
the "Western" tradition has been, in a sense, quite successful, because
it manufactured a picture of legal history that is received as common
sense, shaping an almost universal cultural status quo. What I
maintain is that this status quo is ungrounded, and that there are
possible countermoves, in particular the use of a delegitimizing
critique as an attempt to operate a background/foreground shift.8 I
believe that this kind of critique is necessary to perform a specific,
politically motivated operation of reversing figure and ground,
showing that there are more ways to change the status quo than
previously appeared. The political motive here is to question the
Western cultural dominance in the field of law in favor of a
multicultural view. I do not think that this is a problem of making
new findings, but instead a question of gaining new insights by
approaching the sources from new angles.9 The result will be a global
re-writing of the standard narrative.
I divide my work into two parts. The first is devoted to
reconstructing the historical consciousness of the Western legal
tradition, showing the emergence of a model based on the more or
less explicit assumptions of Roman legal originalism and supremacy,
and of its capacity of survival and renewal.10 In the second part, I
provide some significant examples-like contract law, the conception
of State, the settlement of disputes, and the formation of a legal
culture-which cast doubt on the traditional view of the Western
legal tradition.
In this first part, I report the bases in favor of viewing Roman
Law as a still-useful tool, and in favor of its being at the root of
American and Western legal culture, as distinct from other legal
cultures around the world. Then I briefly investigate the emergence
of the prevailing pattern in German legal studies. I then go on to
depict the overturning of the "Aryan Model" of Roman Law by
showing how the model was related to Comparative linguistics and to
1997).
7. Guy MacLean Rogers, Multiculturalism and the Foundations of Western
Civilization, in BLACK ATHENA REVISITED, supra note 3, at 429.
8. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SItCLE) 248
(1997) [hereinafter D. KENNEDY, CRITIQUE].
9. See Reuven Yaron, Semitic Elements in Early Rome, in DAUBE NOSTER: ESSAYS
IN LEGAL HISTORY FOR DAVID DAUBE 343 (Alan Watson ed., 1974).
10. In this section, the work of O.F. ROBINSON, THE SOURCES OF ROMAN LAW
(1997), has been quite helpful in summarizing the basics of Roman Law.
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the birth of Comparative Law as a political project." In the fourth
chapter I show the opposition between this model and an alternative
"African-Semitic Theory" which has been formulated by French
Orientalists. Thus, I examine the responses that professional
Romanists have made to these challenging theories through their
maintenance of the myth of the "uniqueness" of Roman Law.
Throughout this part, I maintain that there is no reason to deny the
original Roman contribution, but rather that adoring scholars have
grossly exaggerated it.12 I end the first part by discussing the issue of
discontinuity in legal history to see the strategies lying behind the
efforts of seeing the past in terms of a growing tradition. I conclude
that traditions are often invented to manage actual problems, to
pursue actual strategies, and that they are used to hide the real issues
at stake.
At the beginning of the second part, I give the reader a brief
account of basic tenets and institutions of Roman, Egyptian, and
Middle Eastern legal history. These accounts are necessarily
schematic, and not properly part of the argument, but are there to
help readers work through historical materials with which they may
not be entirely familiar.13 Then I examine contract law in its Roman,
Egyptian, and Semitic forms, emphasizing the defects of Roman
primitivism in this field. Then I examine the incapacity of Roman
legal culture to derive a consistent public law conception of the State
to show that the State was ultimately built upon non-Roman patterns.
From here, I attempt to sketch an outline of the Roman legal process
essentially critical of the traditional view of the Roman capacity to
govern society by means of law. This point allows us to undermine, or
at least to raise a suspicion about, the standard approach used to
explain Roman institutions that we normally receive in law school.14
These three examples lead us to a discussion of the central point
of the Roman legal culture as a distinctive trait of Roman Law, and as
the ancestor of the modern Western professional approach. I try to
show that this legal science was fostered by two major waves of
influence from the East, and that its greatest achievements were
reached by abandoning the original structures in a context of de-
Romanization of the later Empire.
My conclusion favors a rejection of the prevalent view taken in
scholarly literature concerning the place of Roman legal history in the
Western legal tradition. I replace that view with a much more
11. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 546-51.
12 See Yaron, supra note 9, at 344.
13. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE
LAW 12-14 (2d ed. 1993), which suggested many of the examples used here.
14. See id.
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plausible one: that what we call "Roman Law" is in fact a
multicultural product effort of different, largely African and Semitic,
Mediterranean civilizations. To strengthen my position I often adopt
conventional theories or evolutionary paradigms to show that
standard accounts contain contradictions. For instance, I use
Berman's definition of tradition 15 as well as Watson's theory of legal
transplants and legal change,16 in order to show that from the
acceptance of non-critical theories we can derive a global critique of
Western legal culture.
I. Manufacturing the Western Roots
A. Genealogies and Governance
Visions of law-in-history have been crucial to liberal and
conservative legal scholarship, 7 and consequently a critical insight
must focus upon them.
In this section I want to show that the currently shared theory
that the Western legal consciousness is historically grounded upon
foundations derived from Roman Law-conceived as an original
offspring of human spirit-is actually due to projects of governance
with strong practical implications.
The subject of this first part of the work is then, so to speak, a
history of historical consciousness in the field of law; an inquiry into
"[tihe cultural function of historical thinking which casts serious
doubt upon history's status as either a rigorous science or a genuine
art." 8 The very idea of "legal evolution" has a history of its own, and
its strategic character is sometimes openly acknowledged even in
traditional literature. 19
My aim is to prove that the historical consciousness on which
Western man has prided himself, since the beginning of the
nineteenth century, may be little more than a theoretical basis for the
ideological position from which Western civilization views its
15. See BERMAN, LAW & REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 5.
16. See generally WATSON, supra note 13; ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY AND LEGAL
CHANGE (1977) [hereinafter WATSON, SOCIETY]; ALAN WATSON, SOURCES OF LAW,
LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY (1984) [hereinafter WATSON, SOURCES]; ALAN
WATSON, LEGAL ORIGINS AND LEGAL CHANGE (1991) [hereinafter WATSON, LEGAL
ORIGINS].
17. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57 (1984).
18. HAYDEN WHITE, METAHISTORY: THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE 2 (1973) (citing Louis 0. Mink, Philosophical Analysis
and Historical Understanding, 21 REV. METAPHYSICS 667, 669 (1968)).
19. PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA ix (1980). See also
the various approaches to legal evolution discussed in E. Donald Elliot, The Evolutionary
Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985).
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relationship, not only to cultures and civilizations preceding it, but
also to those contemporary with it. In short I think that it is possible,
particularly in the field of law, to view historical consciousness as a
specifically Western prejudice by which the presumed superiority of
modern, industrial society can be retroactively substantiated.20
From this standpoint we can start citing various accounts by
eminent scholars which unambiguously state the point. Roman Law
is deemed to be not only the foundation of Western Jurisprudence
but has been, and continues to be, regarded as "one of the finest
creations of the human spirit."'21 It is maintained that it was the work
of even the earliest of Roman jurists who "[11aid the foundations not
merely of Roman, but of European, jurisprudence," 22 including
common law countries23 and commercial matters.24 Roman Law's
importance lies fundamentally in the fact that as a highly advanced
law, it serves as a guide for all of modern law,2 even playing a pivotal
role in the development of the American legal mind.26 As Professor
Mayali noted in his forward to a recent Symposium on Ancient Law:27
In America the Law is king. Thus spoke Thomas Paine ... [his]
claim was not surprising. It was the product of a legal tradition
which can be traced back beyond the Middle Ages to its Roman
roots, a tradition that long ago associated the authority of the law
with the exercise of political power.28
Although Professor Mayali obviously concedes that major breaks
occurred in the legal evolution of Western laws, he reaffirms that:
20. See WHITE, supra note 18, at 2.
21. WATSON, SOCIETY, supra note 16, at 12.
22. FRITZ SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 94 (1946) (referencing Q.
Mucius Scaevola who died in 82 B.C.E.; Scaevola is credited with the first systematic
application of dialectical reasoning to law). See PETER STEIN, REGULAE IURIS: FROM
JURISTIC RULES TO LEGAL MAXIMS 36 (1966); see also BERMAN, LAW & REVOLUTION,
supra note 4, at 136.
23. See Peter G. Stein, Roman Law, Common Law, and Civil Law, 66 TUL. L. REV.
1591 (1992); see also M. H. Hoeflich, Mark John Austin and Joseph Story: Two Nineteenth
Century Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 36 (1985). This point will be quite important in our further discussion.
24. See Peter Stein, Roman Law in the Commercial Court, 46 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 369,
369-71 n.3 (1987).
25. STEIN, supra note 19, at 86.
26. See PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW
411 (1988); M. H. Hoeflich., Roman Law in American Legal Culture, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1723
(1992); see also NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1997) (tracing the "beginnings" of
many American basic conceptions in Roman Law).
27. Symposium, Ancient Law, Economics and Society, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1465
(1995).
28. Laurent Mayali, Social Practices, Legal Narrative, and the Development of the
Legal Tradition, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1469 (1995) (emphasis added).
[W]e can sense the significance of the ancient [Roman] legal
tradition which was so influential in the shaping of the modem
Western legal culture and supplied the foundations of political
reason.
29
Here, in Mayali's narrative, we may find not only an assertion
about Roman influences on our conceptions of the Law, but also a
trend toward the foundation of a universally valid "Political Reason"
grounded upon Western and Roman views. The shift from a theory
of historical derivation toward a theory of sounded superiority is to
me striking and apparent. Thus Roman Law should be at the root of
the distinction between Adjudication and Legislation,30 as one of the
major achievements of the West, or as a target of a critical strategy to
collapse it.31
What is more remarkable is that such biases are shared even by
historians. For instance, in Freeman's wide-ranging book entitled
Egypt, Greece and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient
Mediterranean,32 whereas there are two entries in the index relating to
law, one devoted to Greece and the other to Rome, there is no entry
pertaining to Egypt.33 This immediately creates an impression of
Egypt as a lawless society. In fact, Freeman openly asserts that "[t]he
Western World, its culture, its religious beliefs, its consciousness, has
been shaped for good or bad by Greece and Rome. '34 This, of
course, is odd for a book which purports to deal with at least three
civilizations. Egypt is, after all, mentioned in the title. But then
Egypt's contribution is immediately "denied" in the introduction.
Then, in examining the various legacies of the different cultures, the
author states that "[t]here is the legacy of Roman Law, Greek
political theory (and to a lesser extent, practice), an architectural
heritage, and a literature which, whatever its own merits, has
bequeathed theatre and even the concepts of psychoanalysis to
Western culture." 35 In this way Roman Law alone, among the various
ancient Mediterranean laws is recognized as the legal pillar of
Western civilization.36
29. Id. at 1477.
30. Even the interest in the theory of "rights" is supposed to come from a tradition of
Roman Law scholarship. Geoffrey Samuel, Epistemology, Propaganda and Roman Law:
Some Reflections on the History of the Subjective Right, 10 J. LEGAL HIsT. 161 (1989).
31. See D. KENNEDY, CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at 37.
32. See CHARLES FREEMAN, EGYPT, GREECE AND ROME: CIVILIZATIONS OF THE
ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN (1996).
33. See id. at 628. Moreover, in a book of 638 pages, only about 60 pages are
dedicated to Egyptian history covering a period from 3200 to 500 B.C.
34. Id at 4.
35. Id at 4 (emphasis added).
36. Please note that no mention is made to the "Semitic" origin of the inventor of
psychoanalysis, and the role of wordplay in Hebrew ancient and modern culture. See, e.g.,
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The ideological character of such accounts is peculiar when, for
instance, emphasis is directed toward Greek Democracy with a
systematic "denial" of the strong anti-democratic tradition also
emerging from Ancient Greek culture.37 It is apparent that such
broad cultural accounts, especially when based on the much-vaunted
Roman and Greek individualism, are intended to mark a sharp
distinction between the West and traditional societies, and to reaffirm
a clear superiority of Western patterns.
38
In combination with this biased approach, the legal systems of
the West are presented as part of a common tradition, or more
comfortably a family,39 sharing peculiar values, a similar approach to
legal techniques, and a net of common structures. Not to mention the
theory that these systems are the cornerstone of the "rule of law" in
the modern world, as they have been in history. In this way the
modern discipline of Comparative Law and the old study of Roman
Law converge in the tracing of the roots. As we have seen, even the
split between a Common Law and a Civil Law tradition in the Middle
Ages does not break the unity of this tradition and its link with the
outstanding Roman achievements in the field of Law.4
Of course the praise of Roman Law4' entails a highly positive
(and positivistic) evaluation of the "uniqueness" of the Western Law
as the final outcome of a tradition, as an ongoing uninterrupted
process,42 a inexorable teleology that lead us to where we are today.
Although sometimes we see attempts to reappraise ancient laws,43
Roman Law is clearly put in the front and all the others on the back
of stage; one cannot help but have the sense that in the last years we
face an even more conscious project to restate its usefulness to cope
JOHN B. GABEL ET AL., THE BIBLE AS LITERATURE 36 (3d ed. 1996). In this narrative,
psychoanalysis springs out directly from Greek theater.
37. See generally JENNIFER TOLBART ROBERTS, ATHENS ON TRIAL: THE
ANTIDEMOCRATIC TRADITION IN WESTERN THOUGHT (1994).
38. See AARON GUREVICH, THE ORIGINS OF EUROPEAN INDIVIDUALISM 3
(Kathanne Judelson trans., Blackwell Pub. Ltd. 1995).
39. See Ugo Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the World's
Legal Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 5,23 (1997).
40. See W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON
LAW: A COMPARISON IN OUTLINE, 21 (F.H. Lawson ed., 2d ed. 1965); see also Alan
Watson, Roman Law and English Law: Two Patterns of Legal Development, 36 LOY. L.
REv. 247 (1990).
41. On the massive bibliography, see Michael H. Hoeflich, Bibliographical
Perspectives on Roman and Civil Law, 89 L. LIBR. J. 41 (1997).
42. D. Johnston, Limiting Liability: Roman Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 70 CI.-
KENT L. REV. 1515 (1995).
43. See Richard A. Epstein, The Modem Uses of Ancient Law, 48 S. CAL. L. Rev. 243
(1997); see also David V. Snyder, Ancient Law and Modern Eyes, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1631
(1995).
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with today's problems.44 According to this theory of the "renewal of
the old,"45 Roman Law displays a peculiar capacity to survive and
renew itself through the ages as the cement of Western legal history.
Such a theory is to be intertwined with the restatement of the project
to use Roman Law as the common glue with which to build up a
newer law for European countries 6-a project with quite practical
implications47 in the unfolding of Europe as a cultural alternative to
the United States.
So we face a theory elaborated by the rising academic discipline
of Comparative Law,48 which, consciously or unconsciously, supports
a particular agenda of governance, 49 and toward which it is valuable
to assume a critical attitude. In fact, in this project, Comparative Law
assumes the typical function of depicting the frame of diversities
between an "us" and a "them," a center and a periphery, a West and
an East.50 What is peculiar is that this theory entails a devaluation of
the classical Common Law/Civil Law distinction, in favor of a
convergence among "modern" Western systems which ultimately
depicts a more unitary Western legal family resting on the Roman
pillars of Roman jurisprudence, superior to all the other world legal
44. See Knut Wolfgang Norr, Technique and Substance: Remarks on the Role of
Roman Law at the End of the 20th Century, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 34 (1994).
45. David Johnston, The Renewal of the Old, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 80 (1997).
46. See generally REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION (1990). This work received a mass of
comments showing its importance in today's legal culture. See, e.g., Peter B.H. Birks, The
Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 13 J. LEGAL HIST. 311
(1992); James Gordley, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian
Tradition, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 1002 (1992) (book review); Tony Honore, The Law of
Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 107 LAW Q. REV. 504 (1991)
(book review); David Johnston, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the
Civilian Tradition, 69 TULANE L. REV. 1113 (1995) (book review); Peter G. Stein, The
Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
94 (1994) (book review); Tony Weir, The Laws of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the
Civilian Tradition, 50 CAMPBELL L. REV. 165 (1991) (book review); Simon Whittaker,
The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, LLOYDS MAR. &
COM. L. 298 (1994) (book review).
47. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman Law and European Legal Unity, in TOWARDS
A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 65 (A.S. Hartkamp et al. eds., 1994) (a rising project toward
which few expressed dissenting opinions). See also Pierre Legrand, Against a European
Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997).
48. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat?,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995) [hereinafter Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1)];
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I1): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J.
COMP. L. 489 (1995) [hereinafter Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (11)].
49. See Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman and Comparative Law: The European
Perspective, 16 J. LEGAL HIST. 21 (1995) (some remarks apropos a recent controversy).
50. Kennedy, supra note 5, at 546.
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cultures."I
Although there are some isolated voices of dissent referring to
the "disease" of Roman Law,52 or on the "malaise" of Comparative
Law,53 and although one voice preaches against a European code
based on Romanistic patterns and the convergence theory,54 the
capacity of renewal of Roman Law is received so much as
unscrutinized commonsense that it is even proposed seriously as
assisting us in coping with artificial intelligence. 55
I try to summarize the main tenets of this kind of narrative as
follows:
1. Roman Law was the best developed and most
sophisticated legal system in the ancient world;
2. Roman Law is at the root of the Western Legal Tradition,
making it peculiarly "Western";
3. Roman Law has a vigorous capacity to renew itself and
still today can serve as a basis for actual governance;
4. Roman Law was the well-spring of a peculiar ethnic
"genius" for legal affairs and legal scholarship.
I do not maintain that all Romanists share each of these opinions
fully and equally. Many share only some of its tenets; others may
adhere to each, but to some with less conviction. The degree of
support of one or more of these tenets measures the degree of
commitment to the Theory of Roman Law as the Original
Foundation of Western Law, as well as the degree of emphasis placed
upon its originality, superiority, uniqueness, continuity and
usefulness.
My aim in this article is exactly to challenge this "Originalist"
view of Roman Law and the "Continuity" model associated with it. In
so doing I shall adopt a "Discontinuity" model, a kind of
"Archeological" approach.56
51. See, e.g., CANTOR, supra note 26 (tracing even the beginnings of the Anglo-
American legal tradition into Roman Law). See also WALTER ULLMANN, LAW AND
POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOURCES OF MEDIEVAL
POLITICAL IDEAS 53 (1975) (asserting that the impact of Roman Law upon governmental
practice was without parallel "[p]artly because Roman Law was a mature expression of
the most Roman of all Roman ideas-the idea of law and order" and so "[i]t indelibly
imprinted its seal on the physiognomy of what came to be Western Europe, and in fact
played a major role in its making").
52. James Q. Whitman, The Disease of Roman Law: A Century Later, 20 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & COM. 227 (1994).
53. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 48, at 1961.
54. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996).
55. See Geoffrey Samuel, The Challenge of Artificial Intelligence: Can Roman Law
Help Us Discover Whether Law is a System of Rules?, 11 LEGAL STUD. 24 (1991).
56. MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Alan Sheridan trans.,
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I would emphasize that the elaboration of the Western legal
family is a peculiar enterprise within the discipline of Comparative
Law, and the main method used to divide the world into legal families
or cultural circles57 is still that of genealogies.5 8 The reconstructed
genealogy for Western law is one with its Roman roots. The elements
of the field are organized into a story through an arrangement of
narrative motifs according to a standard theory of the historical
work.5 9 The Roman roots provide, in Hayden White's terms, the
"inaugural motifs" of the narrative, the various events of the Middle
Ages and the rise of the modem State characterize the "transitional
motifs," and the Western systems as presently constructed constitute
the "terminating motifs."60 As with any effort in construction, this
representation necessarily entails exclusion. It is a time-worn
technique of comparative inquiry to contrast the different systems of
law, presenting the inner development of each family,61 something
which indeed seems to me quite un-comparative in nature. Thus, I
think it is important to see how this narrative came into being, since it
is connected both with the renewal of Roman studies and with the
birth of legal comparativism in the German culture.62
My first task, then, is not to discuss whether these ideas are right
or wrong, but try to show how they came about, how they have been
grouped together in a more or less explicit theory, how they have
been challenged, and the response of the professional lawyers who
attempted to call into question these views. And, how and why these
ideas are back on the stage today.
(1) The "Aryan Model"
Ideas do not coalesce by themselves. They are assembled by
real, time-bound people, with actual needs and strategies. If we look
for the package of ideas which lays at the base of the Western self-
consciousness in law, we must come to grips with the sudden
emergence of German legal historicism at the beginning of the last
Random House 1972).
57. See KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6TZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
1 (Tony Weir trans., 2d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1987).
58. For an effort in criticism of conventional approach, see Mattei, supra note 39, at
40.
59. See WHITE, supra note 18, at 5.
60. For a complete discussion of this theory of the historical work, see id.
61. See generally RENA DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN
THE WORLD TODAY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW (3d ed.
1985).
62. For a discussion on the intellectual origins of German legal thought, see Ewald,
Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 48, at 1990-2045.
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century.63 This examination will illustrate that it was based on a
peculiarly insulated conception of Roman Law, and how this
conception came to be mingled with comparativism to produce an
"Aryan model" of the Western legal tradition. 64 By "Aryan model" I
mean a theory of the strong cross-cultural links among different
peoples traceable back to a past, common, Indo-European period,
producing a framework of similarities between their various
institutions.
Legal historicism was the theory adopted by the most influential
German scholar of the time: Karl Friedrich von Savigny, 65 "[t]he
greatest jurist that Europe has produced." 66 Savigny's historicism was
intended to replace a universalistic theory of Natural law as a basis
for a rational purposive discourse on the law, a paradigm which
dominated the legal debate during the "Enlightenment" period in the
eighteenth century.67 Law, Savigny maintained, was deeply rooted in
local traditions; it is an expression of the deepest beliefs of a people,
inseparable from their manners and morals, their customs and history.
For Savigny, there was an organic link between law and the essence of
a nation.68 For him and his followers, the "cult" of Roman Law-a
product of history, not "nature"-had to supersede a universalistic
rational conception of the law.69 Roman Law became the alternative
to the Law of Reason and it was an alternative embodied within
German legal history. Of course to be a valid alternative, Roman
Law had to be extraordinary. Without plunging into details which lie
outside of the scope of the present essay, I would stress that Savigny's
conception of the function of Roman Law was as a common law for
63. For a look at the context of what Ewald has called comparative jurisprudence for
its impact on America, see THE RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON
LAW WORLD 1820-1920 (Mathias Reimann ed., 1993).
64. GABOR HAMZA, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ANTIQUITY (Jbzsef Szabb trans.,
Akad~miai Kiadb 6s Nyomda V~lalat, Budapest 1991), strongly influenced my work
reconstructing the "Aryan model."
65. On Savigny see Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (1), supra note 48, at 2012; see
also Symposium, Savigny in Modem Comparative Perspective, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1
(1989). For the whole of the history of the German legal thought in the early nineteenth
century, see JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE LEGACY OF ROMAN LAW IN THE GERMAN
ROMANTIC ERA (1990).
66. Hermann Kantorowicz, Savigny and the Historical School of Law, 53 L.Q. REv.
326,326-27 (1973) (quoting Sir John Macdonnell).
67. See 0. F. ROBINSON ET AL., EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 242 (2d ed. 1994).
68. See Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 48, at 2016 (citing
FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF SUNSRER ZEIT FOR GESTEZGEBUNCT
UND RECHSWISSENSCHAFr (1814)). In the course of history, the German Empire in the
Middle Ages adopted Roman Law as the general law of the land, and so it became the
root of the German unfolding of a proper national law, in this sense the Germans
succeeded the Romans. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 188.
69. HAMZA, supra note 64, at 34-35.
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Europe, and for Germany in particular.70
Of course Savigny had a strategy, and it was to start a process of
elaboration of a national German law, which indeed started and
ended in 1900 with the codification of a common private law for the
whole Germany. He needed a ground to build upon, and the mass of
Roman legal texts gave him the building blocks for his "scientific"
construction of a newer law. The stress on the overall importance of
Roman Law led him to a conception of Roman Law as something
more than just positive law. Roman Law came with an implied
intellectual history,71 but it was a peculiar history. In order to build a
new German law on its basis, Roman Law had to be studied as a
complete and autonomous system72 which in turn could be elaborated
and developed according to scientific principles into a modem legal
system. It is not hard to see at work here the theory of the renewal of
the old, and an eye towards the projects of governance that are
reaffirmed today.73 This approach produced an "ideology" of Roman
uniqueness which entails an almost total exclusion of all other laws'
importance. 74
It was Eduard Gans in particular75 who conceived his work on
the law of inheritance76 in the spirit of "Universalrechtgeschichte,"
Universal Legal History. He surveyed Indian, Chinese, Hebrew,
Islamic, Scandinavian, Icelandic, Scottish, Portuguese, Attic and
Roman Law, among others.7 7 The introduction to his massive work is
a piece of great interest since it is based on a striving incoherence. He
remarks that no exclusive importance should be given to any law in
respect to other legal systems, 78 but then he asserts the special
importance of Roman Law attributable to the outstanding role played
70. See Franz Wieacker, Friederich Carl Von Savigny, ZSS [Zeitschrift der Savigny-
Stiftung fur Rechtgeschichte (Rom. Abt.)] 85 (1955).
71. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 35 (from whom my argument in this portion of the
article is extensively drawn).
72. See id. at 40.
73. See generally Johnston, supra note 42; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 46.
74. As a typical exclusion we can recall, for instance, the complete denial of any
possible relevance of Hebrew law, notwithstanding that a large amount of German
population was of Jewish origin. While Roman Law could hardly be described as the
product of the German spirit (Volksgeist), it has been a "miracle" of German legal
historicism to have denied any non-Roman influence on the development of a German
national law. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 262.
75. Eduard Gans is reputedly the founder of German Comparative Law. See Mitchell
Franklin, The Influence of Savigny and Gans on the Development of the Legal and
Constitutional Theory of Christian Roselius, in 1 FESTSCHRIFT RABEL 141 (J.C.B. Mohr,
Tfibingen 1954); see also HAMZA, supra note 64.
76. See 1 EDUARD GANS, ERBREcHT IN WELTGESCHICHTLICHER ENTWICKLUNG
[THE LAW OF INHERITANCE IN A WORLD HISTORY PERSPECrIVE] (1824).
77. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 40 (emphasis added).
78. See id. at xxiii.
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by Rome in the entire universal history.7 9 Tellingly, Gans' work,
though it touches practically each corner of the globe, is entitled
"Roman History and Roman Law."
How did this logic of exclusion come to be mingled with
comparativism? Indeed, many of Savigny's followers, such as Anselm
Feuerbach, Karl Theodor Puetter, Gans himself and Unger, came to
be of the opinion that comparative studies were important in Law80 as
well as in Linguistic inquiries.81 It was, then, a comparativism
associated with the strategy of reconstructing the original common
Aryan background of Western civilizations.
This trend towards comparative work gave birth in 1829 to the
Kritische Zeitschrift fPr Rechtwissenschaft und Gesetzgebung des
Auslandes (Critical Review of Comparative Legal Studies) as the first
world journal on Comparative Law, which published twenty-six
volumes through 1853. From a philosophical standpoint, the
ideological foundation of Comparative Law in connection with race
can easily be traced back to Hegel's theory of a close link between
institutions and race,8 and so between Roman institutions and their
Indo-European background. This "Aryan" approach to comparison
relied to a high degree on the findings of Comparative Linguistics,
where the works of Bopp and Jacob Grimm played a pivotal role in
the making of the "Aryan theory." 3
This brief account is not intended to cast doubt on the
scholarship embodied in these works. Certainly the authors engaged
in the building up of the "Aryan Theory" were prominent scholars
with a solid reputation.84 They were not political hacks; nor were they
outsiders, nor were they cranks. What needs to be stressed, though, is
79. See id. at xxv.
80. See itL at43.
81. On the relevance of Linguistics and of Herder on the German legal thought, see
Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), supra note 48, at 2012-20; and for a more general
cultural point of view see also Robert E. Norton, The Tyranny of Germany over Greece?,
in BLACK ATHENA REVISITED, supra note 3, at 403.
82. On Hegel's love for Europe and India and his total disdain of Africa, see G.W.F.
HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF WORLD HISTORY 154-209 (H.B. Nisbet
trans. and ed., 1975). The original work has been published by his disciples after his death
in 1831. On the relations between Hegel and Gans, see HAMZA, supra note 64, at 39-43.
83. HAMZA, supra note 64, at 45; 1 ADOLF F. SCHNITZER, VERGLEICHENDE
RECHTSLEHERE [COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES] 13-14 (2d ed. 1961).
84. We can perhaps sometimes question such reputations on the basis of modem
standards. For example, in 1847 a German expert in cuneiform texts, Oppert, published a
book on Indian Criminal Law. Even if India has nothing to do with cuneiform writings,
showing a lot of common tracks with Roman Law which were still seriously valued at the
end of the century; see the comment on his work in J. GILSON, L'ETUDE DU DROIT
ROMAIN COMPARE AUX AUTRES DROITS DE L'ANTIQUITE [ROMAN LAW COMPARED
WITH OTHER ANCIENT LAWS] 28 (1899).
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the importance of the link between the issue of race85 and high-level
legal studies in nineteenth-century Germany, where the "Aryan
Model" increasingly involved studies of the ancient German Law.
For instance, in Rossbach's work on Marriage 86 we find a comparative
appraisal of Roman, Indian, Greek and German Law which
completes, as it were, the Aryan approach. Rossbach's theory was
that the foundations of this part of the law were basically the same
within the whole Indo-Germanic family, and in fact Rossbach's
findings were inspired by the Aryan theory itself, rather than being
the result of independent tests of the theory. His main argument is
that, notwithstanding the total lack of empirical evidence, the
analogies among the different Aryan laws were attributable to the
close bonds of these peoples who shared a common kinship.87
All these studies produced at the end of the nineteenth century
were different efforts to reconstruct the "Original Aryan Law"
(Urrecht)88 with a strong accent on Aryan ethnic community. These
efforts adopted the methods of comparative linguistics but
reconstructed the pattern of the Original Law on the basis of the
Roman categories. Roman Law was "The Template" toward which
the Original Law evolved.
Even an outstanding scholar like Jhering followed this trend in a
work of Comparative history of Indo-Europeans. 9 He clearly
identified the Law (in general) with Roman Law,9° and traced it and
its perfection back to its Aryan roots. For Jhering, Roman Law
assumed a crucial importance even in the field of Comparative Law
grounded on ethnic terms.9' The Aryan Theory became the key to
understanding the Roman Law's supremacy and uniqueness in
comparison to the other non-Aryan laws.
85. That the Indo-Europeans were intended as one racial group is out of the question,
and this is the point I am interested in here, whereas the skin-color of ancient peoples is
immaterial. See Frank M. Snowden, Jr., Bernal's "Blacks" and the Afrocentricists, in
BLACK ATHENA REVISITED, supra note 3, at 112. Ironically the logic of exclusion can be
as strong as "color-blind."
86. See AUGUST ROSSBACH, UNTERSUCHUNGEN UBER DIE ROEMISCHE EHE
(Stuttgart, C. Maecken, 1853); HAMZA, supra note 64, at 45.
87. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 37; see also id. at 44.
88. B.W. LEIST, ALT-ARISCHES JUS GENTIUM (1889); see also B.W. LEIST, ALT-
ARISCHES Ius CIVILE (1892).
89. RUDOLF VON JHERING, VORGESCHICHTE DER INDOEROPAER [THE EARLY
HISTORY OF INDO-EUROPEANS] (Victor Ehrenberg ed., 1884). This was his last book,
and was edited by Ehrenberg after the author's death. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 44.
90. See Walter M. Wilhelm, Das Recht im roemischen Recht, in Jherings Erbe,
Goettinger Sysmposium zur 150. Wiederkehr des Geburstages von Rudolf von Jhering
(1970).
91. See 3 WOLFGANG FIKENTCHER, METHADONE DES RETEST IN
VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG [COMPARATIVE LEGAL APPROACHES] 250 (1976).
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It is important to note that the Aryan Theory has survived well
into our century. Amaduni, a specialist on Armenian Law,
elaborated a parallel between Roman and Armenian Law which he
attributed to a common Indo-European ethnic origin.92 Of course,
this theory reached a climax in the political biases of the 1930s. The
perfection of Roman Law now taken for granted, the distinction
between Roman and German Law was narrowed, so that the latter
could be said to contain the qualities of the former, and a new model
of an anti-individualistic Roman Law was built in search of a closer
adherence to the political inspiration of the Nazi movement.93 In
Shoenbauer's opinion, it was even impossible to compare the laws of
peoples not ethnically related, such as the Germans and the
Egyptians. 94
It is true that the Aryan Theory was powerfully challenged by
Koshaker 95 before the war, and by Condanari-Micher 96 after it, but
this is not to minimize its success even among cultural comparativists
like Dumrzil.97
Since the historical work represents an attempt to mediate
among the "historical field" and an audience, 98 it is not at all
surprising that such a mediation was reached in nineteenth century
Germany on the following model:
1. Romans, Germans and other peoples are all linked by
their common Indo-European roots;
2. Roman Law was part of an Indo-European legal culture;
3. Roman Law has been the most perfected product of this
culture;
92. See Garabel Amaduni, Influsso del Diritto Romano Giustinianeo sul Diritto
Armeno e Quantitti di Tale Influsso [The Impact of Roman Law on Armenia], in 2 ACrA
CONGRESSUS IURIDICI INTERNATIONALIS (PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE FOR
THE 14TH CENT. FROM THE ENACTMENT OF JuSTINIAN'S LAWS, Rome Nov. 12-17, 1934)
244,245 (1935).
93. Ernst Schoenbauer formulated these ideas in a Lecture delivered at the Deutscher
Rechtshistorikertag in 1936, cited by MICHAEL STOLLEIS, GEMEINWOHLFORMELN IM
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN RECHT [COMMON TRENDS IN NAZI LAW] 35 (1974). See
HAMZA, supra note 64, at 44.
94. See Ernst Schoenbauer, Zur Frage des Eigentumsueberganges beim Kauf, [Transfer
of Property by Sale] in ZEITSCHRIFT DER SAVIGNY-STIFrUNG FUR RECHTSGESCICHTE
(ROM. ABT.) 52 (1932).
95. See Paul Koschaker, Was Vermag die Vergleichende Rechtwissenschaft zur Indo-
germanenfrage Beizusteuern? [What We Got from Indo-Germanic Comparativism?], 1
FESTSCHRIFr HIRT 147 (1936). According to Koschaker, no particular attention should
be paid to race in legal history. See also HAMZA, supra note 64, at 46.
96. See Slavomir Condanari-Michler, Uber Schuld und Schaden in der Antike
[Negligence and Damage in Ancient Law] 3 SCRITrI FERRINI 28 (A. Giuffr6 ed., 1948).
97. See GEORGES DUMEZIL, ARCHAIC ROMAN RELIGION 585 (1966) (referencing
marriage rites in Rome and in ancient India).
98. WHrrE, supra note 18, at 5.
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4. Roman Law can be the basis upon which to ground a
modem German system as the most perfected Western legal
system.
Rome is the projection of a myth. Historical consciousness and
genealogies associated with it have a political dimension which cannot
be underestimated: there is something worth fighting for. It is indeed
quite interesting, in contrast with German professors engaged to the
"Aryan Theory," to see, for instance, Jewish scholars advocating the
presence of Semitic elements in early Rome.99 It seems to me that this
"recall to Rome," even amongst the Jewish scholars, remains a way to
state who we are, and to refine a picture of ourselves.
But a picture depends on a framework. The Aryan framework
revealed itself to be quite successful, but we must consider its rivals,
and how they became losers in the competition of historical theories.
(2) The "African-Semitic Theory"
Having noted the growth of an Aryan theory of Western law,
based on its Roman origin, in this section I show the emergence of a
rival model pointing to Eastern and African origins of Roman Law.
Whereas the Aryan theory is still widespread, and even received as a
commonsense, this rival theory remained in the background, because
it was constantly subjected to criticism, a casualty of the production of
legal history. I do not enter the debate, I just "rediscover" an
alternative model to show the rivalries that occurred among scholars
in the making of the Western legal tradition as a tradition typically
"Western." I call this revisited rival theory the "African-Semitic
Model" because it points to the Middle East and Egypt as places of a
high-level legal culture from whence the Romans borrowed more
advanced legal theories than they themselves possessed when Roman
Law was still quite primitive.
I am not interested in discussing whether Egyptians are to be
labeled as "African" from a racial point of view.10° I use the term
"Africa" or "African" with a mere geographical implication, since the
land of Egypt lies in Africa. I want to use this term because it is
always "denied" in discussions among legal historians, where Egypt is
constantly referred to as an "Oriental" or Middle Eastern country, or
at best a Mediterranean region. Since the discussion is centered on
Aryan origins and it is full of biased terms and labels, I prefer to
assume a purely old-fashioned neutral liberal attitude by referring to
countries on a geographical basis, to show that even from this
superseded standpoint the "denial" of the term "African" is striking,
99. See generally Yaron, supra note 9.
100. See Kathryn A. Bard, Ancient Egyptians and the Issue of Race, in BLACK ATHENA
REvIsrrED, supra note 3, at 103.
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and as such it is quite interesting even if (or especially because) it can
be rationally justified by traditional legal historians. My use can be
so-justified on "neutral" principles, but it is not intended to be neutral
at all. I use it because I want to sharpen the opposition between the
two theories.
For similar but distinct reasons, I prefer sometimes to adopt the
term "Semitic" with reference to the race of peoples involved, rather
than the more neutral geographical terms such as "Middle East" or
"Near-East" and so on. If "they" use Aryan, it is a bit shy to reply
with "Oriental," or the like. If there are political issues at stake I
prefer to emphasize them, rather than hide them under a glaze of
smooth labels. Thus, my use is certainly strategic, but the move here
is just to make "objects" more clear-cut. Whenever non-Semitic and
non-Roman peoples are involved I shall use of course the
geographical terms such as Mediterranean, or Eastern, and so on.
With these provisos in place, we can see that the "African-
Semitic" theory took off after the discovery of the so-called "Syrisch-
roemisches Rechtsbuch," an astonishing ancient Comparative Law
book on Syrian and Roman institutions. 10 From this discovery
sprang a long debate among scholars with some of them emphasizing
Greek (Indo-European) influences, others underlying transplants
from Hebrew (Semitic) Law, and still others stressing an analogy with
cuneiform legal texts. 1°2 The Syrian book was a riddle and a
chameleon,10 3 changing color according to the theoretical aims of the
examining scholar, but it gave an impulse to the studies of cross-
connections between Roman and other non-Indo-European ancient
laws.
It is within such a framework that in the late nineteenth century a
number of French scholars advanced the theory of Roman Law as a
bundle, an amalgam of ancient Eastern and African legal traits. 1°4
This Theory, sound or unsound as it may be, is obviously important
for our argument, as well as an alternative both to the Aryan Model
(and the correlative notion of the "Uniqueness" Model of Roman
101. This "Rechtbuch" was discovered by Land who edited it for publication in 1862.
J.P.N. LAND, ANECDOTA SYRIACA (1862), cited by PAUL KOSCHAKER, DIE KRISE DES
ROEMISCEN RECTS UND DIE ROMANISTISCHE RECHWISSENSCHAFr [TE CRIs Is OF
ROMAN LAW] 276 (1938).
102. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 53.
103. See WALTER SELB, ZUR BEDEUTUNG DES SYRISCH-ROMISCHEN
RECHTSBUCHES [ON THE MEANING OF THE SYRIAN-ROMAN LAW BOOK] 331 (1964).
104. In comparison with the strong reputation still held even by politically biased
German scholars, these French scholars are even today immediately introduced as
"exponents of theories based on fictitious assumptions" and it is said that the discovery of
connections between Roman and Syrian Law "carried in itself the seeds of unscientific
theories, based only on bold hypotheses." HAMZA, supra note 64, at 54.
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Law), since it strongly challenges both. According to this theory,
Roman Law evolved as a bundle of borrowings from Egypt and the
Middle East. 05
It is quite interesting to note that the contrast between the Aryan
and the African-Semitic Theory, pointing toward a Mediterranean
dimension of legal evolution, in contrast with a Northern Aryan one,
exactly matches with a contrast among German and French scholars,
in the well-known context of European rivalries at the end of the
nineteenth century.
Moreover, the clash between the two theories corresponds to a
clash between an evolutionary paradigm and a diffusionist approach,
the former emphasizing that social institutions evolve within a
particular society, and the latter pointing to the spread of institutions
through different cultures. The end of last century and the first
quarter of this century have been an age of war between diffusionists
and evolutionists, 1°6 the two approaches being perceived at the time
as being mutually exclusive. 107 The Aryan Model is based on the idea
of inner evolution whereas the African-Semitic Model conceives of
legal history as a history of transplants and borrowings. It is quite
evident that the first model is race-based (and biased), whatever the
political ideas of its exponents may be, because the inner evolution is
supposed to happen within one racial group of peoples, whereas the
alternative approach patently recognizes the indifference of race
issues to legal development.
The two models also share different ideologies toward Roman
Law, and this may explain in turn the different impact they had on
"professionals." In the Aryan Model, Roman Law is still a superior
final product of an original and unique history of the Indo-European
race. 10 8 In the African-Semitic Model it is, implicitly or explicitly, a
poor law which evolved thanks to borrowings from much more
sophisticated legal patterns developed in the Eastern part of the
Mediterranean basin.
Finally, in the Aryan Model there is implicit also what I might
call a Continuity Model of Roman legal evolution within the Indo-
105. See EUGENE REVILLOUT, LES OBLIGATIONS EN DROIT EGYPTIEN COMPARt
AUX AUTRE DROITS DE L' ANTIQUITt [THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN ANCIENT EGYPT
COMPARED WrIH OTHER RIGHTS OF ANTIQUrrY] 79 (1886) ("[L]'histoire du droit
romain n'est plus que l'histoire d'enprunts successifs.").
106. See ROBERT H. LOWiE, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 430-41 (1920); see also Jackson,
Evolution and Foreign Influence in Ancient Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 372,374 (1968).
107. See BARBARA McNAIRN, THE METHOD AND THEORY OF V. GORDON CHILDE
7 (1980).
108. With some inconsistencies, supporters of this model normally believe that the final
product of a "race-based evolution" can be usefully transplanted to regulate the lives of
other races.
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European family. But adopting the competing African-Semitic point
of view, one can easily employ what I would label as a Discontinuity
Approach'09 to Roman Law because each borrowing, from Egypt or
from the Middle-East, clearly represents a break with the original
Roman tradition.
To understand the sharp opposition between the two models we
must examine the work of the French scholars who built up the
African-Mediterranean Theory: the orientalists Revillout and
Lapogue.
Revillout (1847-1913) is a puzzling and whimsical figure. He was
a scholar in ancient languages, Demotic, Hieratic and Coptic, and
became nothing less then "Conservateur au Louvre" in Paris and
received an honorary degree from the prestigious old University of
Louvain. As such, he was an established scholar in Egyptology, but
he decided to devote himself to the rising discipline of Egyptian legal
studies n1 with the explicit intent to promote a theory of the Egyptian
Origin of Roman Law.1 '
Revillout's central point was that Roman Law grew as a bundle
of legal patterns borrowed from abroad. As such, his theory entirely
rebutted the models developed by professional Romanists. In
particular, he maintained three points on the African-Mediterranean
transplants into Roman Law:
1. Roman Commercial Law and the Law of Obligations,
which is peculiarly presented as a typical product of Roman
jurisprudence," 2 actually derived from Babylonian Law;" 3
2. Public Law, and the framework of Law and Politics
relations were received from Greece;
3. The Law of Persons and general Jurisprudence were of
Egyptian origin.
In his projects, this theory had to be fully developed, jointly with
his brother Victor Revillout, 114 another reputed orientalist, in a new
edition of the Justinian Codes tracing back the non-Roman origin of
109. For a discussion of this opposition between continuity and discontinuity in
historical appraisals, see infra note 164 and related text.
110. See EUGENE REVILLOUT, LA PROPRIETA, SES DtMEMBREMENTS, LA
POSSESSION ET LEURS TRANSMISSIONS EN DROIT EGYPTEN COMPARt AUX AUTRES
DROITS DE L'ANTIQUIrt [PROPERTY AND POSSESSION IN EGYPTIAN LAW] (Ernest
Leroux ed., 1897); EUGENE REVILLOUT, PRECIS DU DROrr EoYPTlEN COMPARf- AUX
AUTRES DROITS DE L'ANTIQurrt [A TEXTBOOK ON EGYPTIAN LAW] (Girard & Bri~re
1903). On Revillout, see HAMZA, supra note 64, at 54.
111. See EUGENE REVILLOUT, LES ORIGINES EGYPTIENNES DU DRO1T CIVIL
ROMAIN [THE EGYPTIAN ORIGINS OF ROMAN CIVIL LAW] (Librarie Paul Geuthner,
1912).
112. See ZIMMERMANN, supra note 46, at 1.
113. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 54.
114. See id. at 54-55.
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each rule, text or opinion, embodied into the Emperor's Compilation,
book by book and page by page. We can see today the extent to
which his project was really an essay in the global deconstruction of
Roman Law, as well as a critique of the prevailing doctrines. He
pursued a global critique" 5 of the legal history of his time.
For his theory Revillout, who was a professional Egyptologist,
gained among legal historians and Romanists (who were not and
normally are not specialists in Egyptian history) a bad name; even
today, his ideas are presented as purely "unscholarly. ''" 6
Was he really a crank? Certainly he was proud and isolated.
From my personal reading of him, I found that he thought himself to
have broken a new path, and to be alone in the wandering." 7
Certainly he shared quite an old-fashioned conception of the geniuses
of different races: Romans were pure Indo-Europeans as were the
Dorians, and they were essentially fit for the war; the Babylonians, by
contrast, he conceived of as having peculiar genius for commerce;
Egyptians had a special capacity for moral speculation.1' 8 These
categories notwithstanding, he was not what we would understand
today as a "racist." With respect to India, Revillout denied any debt
of "our" civilization to the "Indians" and attributed no importance to
the sharing of a "common blood"; but at the same time Revillout's
discourse really strikes his audience by affirming that "we" have
nothing to share with the Jews "except" our religious attitude." 9
Plunging deeper into the details of Revillout's theories, the
reader sees oddities begin to emerge. For example, he maintains that
even the drafters of the Twelve Tables, the first piece of Roman
legislation,120 were inspired by the experience of the Egyptian tyrant
Amasis of some decades before, who is presented as a kind of an
Egyptian Cromwell.' 2 It is hard to hew to this story, particularly
because it is so much sound and fury. Its source criticism is
embryonic, the narrative is biased exactly as in the works of
unrecognized geniuses, who must stand up against all the world with a
feeling of revenge. There can be no doubt, in any case, that Revillout
based his work on a diffusionist approach 22 as opposed to the model
115. On a definition of global external and global internal critique, see D. KENNEDY,
CRMQUE, supra note 8, at 92-93.
116. HAMZA, supra note 64, at 56.
117. See REVILLOUT, supra note 110, at Part v ("La science du droit 6gyptien, cr 6 par
moi, progresse chaque jour par suite de mes nouvelles 6tudes.").
118. See id at Parts v- vi.
119. Id. at Part vi ("[N]ous ne tenons rien de l'Inde, si ce n'est peut-etre un sang
commun, et que le juifs ne nous ont guere fourni que leurs traditions messianiques.").
120. See ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 2.
121. See REVILLOUT, supra note 110, at 21.
122. See P. Haider, Vergleichende Voelkerkunde, in F. HAMPL & I. WEILER,
[Vol. 51
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of organic inner evolution of the Aryan theory; an approach today
easily dismissed as outdated. But in the years around the end of last
century, it provided a rival alternative to the old prevailing
evolutionarist approach.123
My point is not to show that he was good, even if he was a well-
recognized scholar in his day. What is important is to recognize that
Revillout proposed a new paradigm, and to understand what the
reaction was. Thus I assume once again a "neutral" attitude, because
I think it suffices to show, in the next section, that if his theory had
defects, the reaction it provoked was no better.
According to Hamza, Revillout was not alone.124 Another
prominent French orientalist, Professor Lapogue,125 independently
pursued a similar approach. Stressing the influence of Assyrian law,
Lapogue argued two points, the first relating to the Roman Republic
and the second to the great Jurists of the Empire. His first point is
that the "foreign Praetor' n 26 in Rome transplanted into Roman Law
large portions of Oriental legal systems. 27 His second point is that a
further major transplant occurred during the age of the great classical
jurists, since none of them (especially Papinian and Ulpian)128 was of
Roman origin. But the bulk of Lapogue's theory is that the jurists'
work was dedicated to the widening of Roman Law by transforming it
from the law of the city of Rome into a "global" law reaching across
the Empire by including many of the practices of the provinces within
the framework of Roman categories. This point is more appreciated
than it could have been given the colonial discourse which dominated
Europe at the end of last century.129
The work of Lapogue seems more sound than the whimsical
VERGLEICHENDE GESCHICHTWISSENScHAFr [COMPARATIVE HISTORY] 185 (1978).
123. See LOWIE, supra note 106, at 21.
124. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 55.
125. On the prominence of Lapogue, see HAMZA, supra note 64, at 55.
126. The Praetor was the Roman magistrate encharged to superintend jurisdiction. See
H. F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HIsTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
ROMAN LAW 46-50 (1939). He was not a judge in the modem sense of the word. See id.
A Roman civil trial, until well into the empire, always took place in two stages. See id
The Praetor was charged, in the first stage, to settle the issue in question. See id. Then, in
the second stage, the actual trial took place and the issue settled by the Praetor was
decided by a judge (judex) who was not a magistrate, but a private person appointed for
the purpose. See id. In 242 B.C.E. a division of duties was established between two
Praetors, one (praetor urbanus) superintending the jurisdiction between citizens, and the
other (praetor peregrinus, "foreign" praetor) who handled disputes between foreigners or
between citizens and foreigners. See id
127. See G. Lapogue, Le Dossier de Bunanitun, in NOUVELLE REvUE HISTORIQUE DE
DROIT FRANCAIS ET tTRANGER 10 (1886).
128. See infra notes 346, 349 and accompanying text.
129. See discussion infra Part ll.F (entitled "Redaction and Deromanization").
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suggestions of Revillout on the XII Tables, but it was immediately
associated with them and treated with irony.130 This was unfair.
Lapogue had reached independent results, and developed
independent arguments. The strategy adopted against him used the
worst parts of Revillout's appraisal to cast doubt upon his theories.
To attack Lapogue, critics stressed Lapogue's admittedly weak
contention of a spread of patterns from Assyrian Law, and it was easy
to show that he came to his conclusions on the basis of a single
cuneiform tablet.131 But the criticism was unfair. It is not that
Lapogue reached a conclusion on the basis of a single document, but
rather that the analysis of a single newly discovered document led him
to advance hypotheses which needed to be tested. He proposed a
new model of Roman Law origins, but his proposals were dismissed
before they were really examined. Lapogue had in fact proposed
several arguments based on analysis of the Roman legal process, for
which a large mass of documents was available, but his work was
rejected ab initio for his suggestion of an "Assyrian connection," for
which he possessed just a single document. Thus, the uniqueness of
the Assyrian source was used to cast a doubt on his whole work.
The counter-attack mounted by the traditional Romanists is a
cornerstone of how the actually received ideas on Roman Law and
the West came together, so I analyze the details of these reactions in
the next section.
B. Reaction to Revisionism: The Professional Resistance
The "African-Semitic" hypothesis produced a strong reaction in
the world of professionals. This reverse trend was led by Gilson in
France, and in Germany by such eminent scholars as Mitteis and
Goldschmidt. The thrust of their reaction was to praise Roman
"originalism" and "capacity of renewal," and this emerged as a
strategic response to interfering non-professionals. Roman Law, they
argued, may have borrowed patterns from abroad, but it was Roman
legal genius and the supreme capacity of Roman Law which
transformed these borrowings into refined legal conceptions. By
treating exogenic contributions as raw legal materials, their
contribution could be minimized or ignored.
This "Uniqueness Model" was built in France by Gilson after
Glasson's approach to the coexistence of various Mediterranean and
Middle-Eastern Laws. Glasson, especially in the second edition of a
130. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 55, with reference to LUDWIG MITrEIS,
REICHSRECHT UND VOLKSRECHT IN DEN OSTLICHEN PROVINZEN DES R6MISCHEN
KAISERREICES [STATE LAW AND POPULAR LAW IN THE EASTERN ROMAN EMPIRE] 13
(B.G. Teubner 1891).
131. See HAMzA, supra note 64, at 55.
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work on marriage and divorce,132 mixed the historical approach with
comparative analysis. But in his approach, comparison did not
involve an appraisal of borrowings. His approach could not avoid
considering the relative importance of African-Mediterranean Laws,
but he tried to master and control the meaning of their very existence
through a typological approach: 33  a framework based on the
independent lives of different laws without any consideration of the
possible reciprocal borrowings and transplants. We must stress the
fact that in Glasson's work there is no room for the "Aryan
Model": 34 his typological approach allowed Roman Law to grow
independently from any other pre-existing law.
The stress on the autonomy of Roman Law well-rooted in this
approach was clearly stated by Gilson some twenty years later.135 At
the very end of the nineteenth century he could not deny the
borrowings that occurred in Roman Law through the practice of
international jurisdiction exercised by the Praetor.36 But, with the
help of a metaphor, he etherized their possible impact on the purity
and uniqueness of Roman Law. He used the metaphor of the
"organic assimilation" of these traits from abroad, which did not
change the "autochthonous" character of Roman Law. 37 It is
important to our argument here to report his own words:
By the contact with foreign legal conceptions, which occurrence is
now well established, [Roman Law] renewed itself. As an organism
it assimilated these foreign elements, which did not deform the
Roman legal system, but on the contrary contributed to make it
more lively and young. 138
It's easy to extract from this quotation three different elements:
First, the borrowings from the African-Mediterranean legal world are
taken for granted and well-established, not by an outsider or a
supposed crank, but by one of the leaders of the profession. Second,
we see the Romanist pre-supposition that foreign elements could only
"deform" an originary and pure Roman Law. It is impossible to
132. ERNEST GLAsSON, LE MARIAGE CIVIL ET LE DIVORCE DANS L'ANTIQUITi ET
DANS LES PRINCIPALES LIGISLATIONS MODERNES DE L'EUROPE [MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE IN ANCIENT AND MODERN EUROPEAN LAW] (A. Durand, 2d ed. 1880). On
Glasson, see HAMZA, supra note 64, at 55.
133. See LJ. CONSTANTINESCO, RECHTVERGLEICHUNG BAND I [COMPARATIVE
LAW] 126 (1971).
134. HAMzA, supra note 64, at 55-56.
135. See GILSON, supra note 84, at 24.
136. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
137. HAMZA, supra note 64, at 56.
138. GILSON, supra note 84, at 10 ("Au contact de ces iddes juridiques 6trang~res dont
la persistance est aujourd'hui nettement 6tablie, il a renouvel6 sa substance. Mais, comme
les organismes, il s'est assimil6 ces 616ments 6trangers. Ceux-ci n'ont pas ddform6 le
syst~me romain, ils Pont au contraire, vivifi6 et rejeuni.").
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conceive that Roman Law could receive an improvement from
African-Mediterranean laws. (Clearly the discourse slights from
scientific toward biased aesthetic values.)
Finally, in this aesthetic framework the problem of the "contact,"
and possible "contamination" of Roman Law is solved by the use of a
metaphor, a mere rhetorical device: thanks to Roman genius the
contact resolved in an organic assimilation, showing the fabulous
capacity of renewal139 of Roman Law even vis-a-vis such risky
contacts with cultural "others."
We confront here the major characteristics of the myth of
Roman Law: its capacity for renewal and assimilation, and ability to
remain a unique and excellent legal system.
This approach has been indeed shared by such later outstanding
scholars as Lambert and Appleton.140  Both Lambert' 41 and
Appleton,142 studying the Law of Inheritance and Wills, stressed the
autonomous character of Roman Law in such a way that the very
existence of borrowings became the solid proof of its uniqueness and
superiority. We can admire the making of this doctrine as a masterful
work of cultural defense.
On the German side, we encounter even greater achievements of
cultural defense in the works of Mitteis and Goldschmidt. The two
pursued two very different strategies, both directed to sterilize
possible influences from Asia and Africa on Roman Law. One
strategy was based on the role of Greek culture in the transplant of
African-Semitic patterns; the other was grounded on general
economic considerations. Both analyzed and strongly challenged the
works of Revillout.
Mitteis is considered the founder of the School of Antike
Rechtgeschichte, the study of Ancient Mediterranean Laws, through a
seminal work on the "vulgar" popular law applied in the Eastern part
of the Roman Empire.143 He did not deny the great impact of Eastern
models on Roman Public Imperial Law (a point we shall discuss in
detail below), but astonishingly enough, he attributed these patterns
to the Greeks. He lent crucial importance to the Greek influence on
the development of post-classical Roman Law.' 44 The point is that
139. For a restatement of such capacity of renewal, see Johnston, supra note 42.
140. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 56.
141. E. LAMBERT, LA TRADITION ROMAINE SUR LA SUCCESSION DES FORMES DU
TESTAMENT DEVANT L'HISTOIRE COMPARATIVE [FORMS OF WILL IN ROMAN LAW IN
LIGHT OF COMPARATIVE HISTORY] (1900).
142. E. APPLETON, LE TESTAMENT ROMAIN. LA MPSTHODE DU DROIT COMPARt ET
L'AUTHENTICIT DES XII TABLES [WILLS IN ROMAN LAW. COMPARATIVE LEGAL
METHODOLOGY AND THE QUEST FOR AUTHENTICITY OF THE XII TABLES] (1902).
143. MIrTEis, supra note 130, at 13.
144. See HAMZA, supra note 64, at 56.
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the form of the Sacred Empire adopted to govern ancient Rome in
the Post-Classical Age (after the third century C.E.) had been existing
in Western Asia and Asia and in Egypt.145 The Greeks never
developed it. But when Alexander conquered both Egypt and the
Middle East his descendants adopted this form. In Mitteis' theory it
was the influence of the Greek Hellenistic Ideal upon Roman Law
which explains the final adoption of this form as the form of the late
Roman Empire. Mitteis' strategy is clear: Asian and African Models
were adopted first by the Greeks and then, centuries later, by the
Romans, and the Roman borrowing was a transplant from Greece,
within the Indo-European Family.
It's like confusing the milkman with the cow. Since everything
which was Egyptian, or Assyrian, or Persian, has been filtered by
Greek culture, all this became a Greek Ideal and so the Romans were
indebted to the Greeks and not to Greek predecessors. Here again
we find the "German fondness" for Greece.146 Indeed such a
prominent scholar as Paul Koschaker perceived the strategic
character of this theory and showed how it could help to avoid
"dethroning" Roman Law.147
Goldschmidt's strategy was quite different. He stressed the
economic unity of the Ancient Mediterranean world as a whole, 14
thinking that this unity could justify the use of a "genetic" method in
studying the legal institutions of the Egyptians, Babylonians,
Assyrians, Greeks and Romans. Thus Goldschmidt was prepared to
see some Roman institutions as outsprings of previous Eastern or
Egyptian conceptions, and to examine the African-Mediterranean
Model proposed by Revillout on this ground. But Goldschmidt
strongly and openly criticized Revillout's works not on the ground of
historical findings, or by means of source criticism, but rather just
because the French orientalist had not realized that the
"Rechtsschoepfung", the Law-Making capacity, "[w]as peculiar to the
Roman genius. ' 149 His theory is so imbued with pre-conceptions of
Roman superiority in Law, that this unexamined pre-conception is
openly stated as the pillar of the theory. He did not contest the
appearance of the germs of many commercial institutions in
Babylonian, Egyptian, Phoenician and Greek Law; he maintained,
however, that these institutions received an "adequate legal form"
only in Roman Law. Thus, he did not deny the borrowings
145. See discussion infra Part II.C (entitled "The 'Origin of the State"').
146. Norton, supra note 81.
147. Koschaker, supra note 95, at 274.
148. See 1 LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS [HANDBOOK OF
COMMERCIAL LAw] 43 (Stuttgart, F. Enke, 3d ed. 1874).
149. Id. at 38 n.72; see also HAMZA, supra note 64, at 57.
BLACK GAIUSMarch 2000]
themselves, but maintained that Roman genius alone transformed
these borrowings into working legal institutions. It is again Rome's
inexplicable "uniqueness" which transforms, like King Midas's hand,
mud into gold. That is why Goldschmidt can rebuff Revillout's and
Lapouge's theories as "dreams and fairy tales"'5 0 and reaffirm
"unambiguously... the supremacy of Roman Law.' 151
The continuous discoveries, including the finding of the Stele of
Susa in 1901, with the text of the Code of Hammurabi, 15 2 gave
growing momentum to the African-Semitic hypothesis, so that
Mueller, a well-reputed Austrian scholar, proposed the Model of a
common Mediterranean law, of which Roman Law would have been
only an instance.153 But once again his theory, presented just as an in-
progress tentative explanation, was slashed down by legal historians
as idle and unsound.15 4 The main argument against him was always
an appeal to Roman uniqueness in developing "primitive" ideas
eventually shared with other ancient civilizations.
At the end of this section I wish to anticipate what is more fully
developed in the second part, reporting that today source criticism,
based on a direct appraisal of many ancient legal documents, is
producing a shift in thinking and making point for Revillout. In a
recent American appraisal of hundreds of Egyptian legal documents
Cruiz-Uribe concludes as follows:
I do believe that Revillout was correct in his approach... and that
a new examination of the material, using Revillout's premise as a
starting point, is in order.155
Such revisionism, is nowhere supported by "experts" in Roman
Law, with the outstanding exception of Hamza. Rather, it is to be
developed by independent ancient law scholars outside the academic
circles of Romanists.
C. The "Western Canon": Tradition and Dissemination
Now that we have reconstructed a history of the historical
consciousness 156 of the Western legal tradition as such, we are
equipped to discuss the tenets that lie behind the package of the so-
150. Id. at 52.
151. Id. at 59.
152 See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
153. See W. MUELLER, DIE GESETZE HAMMURABIS uND IHR VERHAELTNIS ZUR
MOSAISCHEN GESETZGEBUNG, SOWIE ZU DEN 12 TAFELN [THE CODE OF HAMMURABI
COMPARED WITH MOSAIC AND ROMAN LAWS] (1903).
154. See Piero Bonfante, II Codice di Hammurabi e le XII Tavole [The Hammurabi
Code and the Twelve Tables], in 1 MLANGES CORNIL 119 (Gand ed. 1926).
155. EUGENE CRUZ-URIBE, SAITE AND PERSIAN DEMOTIC CATTLE DOCUMENTS: A
STUDY IN LEGAL FORMS AND PRINCIPLES IN ANCIENT EGYPT 80 (1985).
156. See WHrrE, supra note 18, at 1.
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called Western legal tradition.
My point is neither that Revillout and Lapouge were right, nor
that they were cranks. I am not at all interested in their reputation,
any more than I am interested in the reputations of the other German
scholars we have encountered. Besides, I do not think that we have,
to this day, enough knowledge of the Ancient world to fully support
their theories. I just want to stress that the responses of professionals
to the African-Semitic Hypothesis have been "poetic" ones-
metaphors, rhetorical tricks, aesthetic arguments- which certainly do
not match their own alleged scientific standards. What is interesting
to me is this form of embarrassment displayed by professionals,
leading them to deny their own conventional "scientific" tenets. The
professionals do not feel at ease, and so they tend to use tropes
5 7
instead of arguments to make their points.
We have seen that professional legal historians admitted a longer
and growing number of borrowings, but they refined a model where
these borrowings are inserted within a framework of "ever-renewing"
Roman Law. This model, I maintain, is the same one we see at work
today in Johnston's or Zimmerman's theories.158 It is a model aimed
at showing, but also based upon, a continuity and greatness of the
Roman tradition which they place beyond dispute. The previous
Aryan Model has been abandoned, and the most exalted praise of
Roman uniqueness is no longer openly recited, but in the course of
the debate, a newer, even stronger model is elaborated.
I will try to sketch this model and its built-in protections against
external critiques, as well as its importance for the actual
understanding of the Western legal tradition.
This model is based, first of all, on the very idea of tradition as a
living and regenerating body of conceptions and ideas. To discuss it,
we may rely here on the same theory of Berman about traditions, as
the last general effort to reassemble the package of the Western legal
tradition. According to this theory, to speak of a "tradition" of law in
the West is to call attention to two major factors:1 59 first, that legal
institutions developed continuously over generations and centuries,
with each generation consciously, even if not necessarily deliberately,
building on the work of previous generations toward particular goals;
and, second, that this process of continuous development is conceived
as a process not merely of change but of organic growth.16° In this
model, a tradition is a "real" thing existing out there: something we
can observe. It is something in which we participate, something to
157. See id. at 31-32.
158. See Johnston, supra note 42; see also ZIMMERMANN, supra note 46.
159. BERMAN, supra note 4, at 5.
160. See idU at 5-7.
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which we contribute as it evolves. But a "tradition" is not a result or
a creature of our own strategy. It is not conceived as a peculiar
product of a framework we impose on external facts to try to create
from them a meaningful picture.
If this is the case, I simply maintain that this idea of tradition, still
cultivated in law, clashes with the "framework notion of
understanding" that now predominates in the human sciences. 161 I
think that the grouping together of various elements, differing in time
and space, and then stating that the whole of these elements make up
a single unity-a single unified tradition-is the result of adopting a
"framework." The adoption of a framework depends on a theory.
We must have a theory justifying the framework we use. The framing
of a theory is a purposeful activity. Theories are not impressed upon
us by impudent external facts. We adopt a theory to pursue a
purpose. This simply means that a theory depends on our strategies.
That is why, in the end, the "existence" of a tradition is the outspring
of our present strategies. "Traditions" which appear or claim to be
old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented. 162 The
"course" of history, the narrative of human agency from past to
present, is an illusion. Our past is in a way always an invention of our
present.163
If we adopt this Framework notion of historical understanding
we are prepared to appraise two alternative and opposite theories: a
model of history as tradition and continuity, and an opposite
"discontinuity" approach.164
It is quite interesting to note that, whereas Western legal
historians have adopted in the last ten years a marked bias in favor of
continuity, without an open debate on the merits of this bias, and its
implications, 165 such a debate happened in the 1980s among Marxist
legal historians who openly posed the question of discontinuity in
development,166 with a strong emphasis by some radical scholars on
161. William Outhwaite, Hans-Georg Gadamer, in THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY
IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 23 (Quentin Skinner ed. 1985).
162. Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION 1 (Eric Hobsbaum & Terence Ranger eds. 1996).
163. Mark Philip, Michel Foucault, in THE RETURN OF GRAND THEORY, supra note
161, at 78.
164. I derive this distinction between continuity and discontinuity in "histories" from
my reading of MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (Alan Sheridan
Smith trans., Random House, 1972) (1969). You may find similar suggestions in HAYDEN
WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM NARRATIVE DISCOURSE AND HISTORICAL
REPRESENTATION 109-84 (1987).
165. These implications and merits are sometimes discussed by Western historians
outside the legal field. See, e.g., STUDIES IN SOCIAL DISCONTINUITY (Charles Tilly, ed.,
1972).
166. See VLADIMIR VAVR1NEK, FROM LATE ANTIQUITY TO EARLY BYZANTIUM
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discontinuity in the structuralist spirit.167 I have the feeling that the
political dimension of historical accounts, by which I mean the
approach chosen to mediate between the historical field and an
audience, can easily emerge from this opposition of attitudes. A
radical society is much more ready to legitimate itself on a
discontinuity, and radical historians can more easily be open to
recognize major breaks, and revolutionary moments, in the "Course
of History." But if this is true for radicals, the reverse is also true for
non-radicals engaged in a project of genealogical legitimization,
where a recall to the past can serve to manage the issues raised by
dramatic changes. And indeed, the continuity approach, which leads
us to "observe" the existence of traditions, is based, at the very root,
on a tendential but systematic denial of change in history. 6 The
Continuity approach always internalizes change within an "evolving"
tradition, and strategic choices tend to be presented more as
responses to a past context with strong constraints, than as
deliberative and purposive projects of more or less political nature
aiming at designing the future. 69
Now we can perceive how feeble this approach is in fact. It is
feeble because its very foundation lies in the desire to see continuity,
and an unwillingness to admit change. But it is quite easy to simply
reverse this approach. Since it is based on putting continuity in the
foreground, and changes and breaks in the background, we can adopt
the delegitimizing move to reverse the grounds. So we can contrast
the evolutive model with a kind of "archeological" discontinuous
70
approach to the dissemination 7' of events. The idea of discontinuity
is indeed well established in Foucault, according to whom history
becomes effective to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into
(Academia Praha ed. 1985) (reflecting a symposium on continuity versus discontinuity in
the Formation of Byzantine Society, organized by the International Committee for the
Promotion of Classical Studies in the Socialist Countries).
167. See A.P. KAZHDAN & G. CONSTABLE, PEOPLE AND POWER IN BYZANTIUM: AN
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN BYZANTINE STUDIES (1982). For a Western critical survey
of structural history, see CHRISTOPHER LLOYD, THE STRUCTURES OF HISTORY 66-88
(1993).
168. On the conservative use by lawyers of history as "continuity and tradition," see
Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57,57 (1984).
169. In this kind of approach when conscious design is admitted, it is tentatively
managed in a "scientific" way, see Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal
Evolution, 90 YALE LJ. 1238 (1981), with a strong emphasis on "testability" and
"predictions."
170. CHARLES C. LEMERT & GARTH GILLAN, MICHEL FOUCAULT: SOCIAL THEORY
AND TRANSGRESSION 41 (1982); see also MICHEL FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-
MEMORY, PRACTICE 154 (D.F. Bouchard ed. 1977).
171. On the use of "dissemination" as a practice in humanities, see JACQUES DERRIDA,
SPURS: NIETZSCHE'S STYLES (Barbara Harlow trans. 1979).
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our very being. I think that his approach is peculiarly important here
because it casts "[s]erious doubt on the value of a specifically
'historical' consciousness," stressing "the fictive character of historical
reconstructions."'172  Thus we can see how the paradigm of
discontinuity is linked with the pattern of dissemination, and opposed
to the evolutionary model.
From this point of view, events, like statements, are to be seen in
a dispersion, and it is clear that they do not come together by
themselves in forming a theory. They are assembled by real people
with the cement of a narrative, and according to a strategy of
assemblage. They are manufactured and processed in a theory.
Every theory is a construction, an artifact, and construction entails
exclusion. History, indeed, is a form of writing, having to do with
discontinuity as a core feature of events. 73 If we remember that the
understanding depends on adapting a framework, the grouping of
events depends on a theory, and the adoption of a theory depends on
a strategy, we can easily pursue the challenge of questioning why the
continuity model is chosen rather than the alternative model of
discontinuity. Thus, from my own viewpoint, the interest in praising
Roman and Western original legal genius, as opposed to borrowing
from other civilizations, is attributable to the larger project of
sustaining retroactively the alleged "cultural" superiority of modern
industrial society. A new rich needs, after all, a genealogy to show
that it is not as new as it appears to be.
I shall try to show in the second part of this work why there are
good reasons to adopt the opposite views and to abandon this
prejudice. Here I still want to stress how this discussion is crucial not
only for legal history but for Comparative Law as well. Dispersion,
and dissemination are one with diffusion. To disperse is to scatter, to
venture out, to spread abroad, to diffuse, as the sprinkling of water
drops, or the casting of seeds in sand, rocks or grass. Thus, the
problem of dissemination and discontinuity in history involves the
problem of the dispersion of legal traits.
As I have said before, I presume that Watson's theory of legal
transplants' 74 fits well in this framework, and can be very useful.
Watson's theory is normally challenged as conservative, or worse. 75
But I think it can be turned into a powerful tool for a critical theory of
legal history. The delegitimizing role Watson's theory can play has
not been properly understood, and therefore its revolutionary
potential has not been appreciated. I do not espouse all of Watson's
172. WHITE, supra note 18, at 1-2.
173. See JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY 291 (Alan Bass trans. 1982).
174. See WATSON, supra note 13.
175. See Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (11), supra note 48.
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assertions, and I dissent on many points. Like all theories, it is a
package, and we can deconstruct it by using some features and
rejecting others. I also think, however, that we retain the bulk of
Watson's transplant theory if we adopt the reading of it which
follows. What I do now is to try to give a radical interpretation of the
theory of legal transplants, instead of a conservative one, displaying
how this form of conservatism can be used for delegitimization and
critique.
If one postulates an inherently close relationship between law
and the society in which it operates, legal transplants ought to be
virtually impossible. Watson rejects this idea; he postulates that law
develops mainly by borrowing and that the history of law is
characterized by a prodigious amount of borrowing. 176 Legal systems
are normally amalgams of patterns received by other systems.
Borrowing is common throughout social life, and thus the prevalence
of borrowed elements in law is hardly explicable entirely in terms
peculiar to law. Legal borrowing calls for special explanation only
insofar as it differs from other kinds of cultural diffusion. What is
needed in the study of the diffusion of legal ideas is not simply a
catalog of borrowed "traits," but an examination of the devices for
cultural sharing and selection through which legal "unity" is
constructed and sustained. From this standpoint the essence of a
culture is contained in its contradictions, the adoption of foreign
elements, and the ideological presentation of these elements as
composing a unity.177 Ultimately, Comparative Law should aim to
produce a general theory about law and legal change and the
relationship between legal systems and rules and the society in which
they operate. 78 As Roscoe Pound noted, "[h]istory of a system of law
is largely a history of borrowings of legal materials from other legal
systems."'1 79 I think that this is a perfect statement of a critical view of
the law and of legal tradition.
The conservative flavor normally is perceived in what I call
Watson's "serendipity approach" to legal change. Chance, he argues,
plays a major role in determining what law will be borrowed: 80 legal
transplants have not usually been the result of a systematic search for
the most suitable model; social and economic factors have a much
more attenuated effect than is normally supposed in theories of law
176. See WATSON, supra note 13, at 6; WATSON, LEGAL ORIGINS, supra note 16, at
293.
177. See Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313,
326 (1978).
178. See icL at 321-34.
179. ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 94 (1938).
180. See WATSON, supra note 13.
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and society, law is largely autonomous operating in its own sphere. 181
Besides, Watson emphasizes in his accounts the absurdity and casual
occurrence of many transplants, aiming, one senses, to mock every
effort to build a theory. In this sense he is a theoretical scofflaw who
produces a mass of possible counter-examples to quiet every
imaginable theory.
I think that the criticism of law's autonomy singled out by
Watson is misconceived and politically naive. Watson's premise is
that the law is largely autonomous because it is largely the product of
a law-making 6lite relatively insulated from social concerns and
constantly in search of legitimacy. From this point of view his theory
of legal autonomy can be used as strong critique of the existing and
unlegitimated governing 6lites of lawyers, 182 especially in Western
countries. 83 The theory gives us a picture of law as a bundle of
borrowings pursued by insulated 6lites, who constantly deny the fact,
and who present highly sophisticated theories of interpretation and
scholarly elaborated genealogies of evolution, which are intended as
strategies of legitimization. And if it is true, as Watson maintains,
that both Roman and English legal history furnish striking examples
of legal rules often out-of-step with the needs and aspirations of
society, or any particular group or class within society,184 it becomes
apparent that lawyers, and 6lites, especially in the West, are claiming
a legitimization they do not deserve. 85
This reading of Watson's theory may well be intended as a strong
basis for critique, as well as it shows how Comparative Law can be
used for delegitimizing projects. I think that my reading shows how,
using Watson's viewpoint alone, without any further reference to
181. See ALAN WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 119 (1985).
182. See D. KENNEDY, CRITIQUE, supra note 8, at 284, on the emphasis on the role of
61ites as a distinctive feature of progressive historicism in comparison with neo-Marxian
analysis.
183. For a use of Watson's theory pointing at "borrowings" as "techniques" of legal
elites in collaboration with political leaders, with reference to Islamic law, see Donald L.
Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the Theory of
Legal Change, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 543,570 (1994).
184. For a restatement of the theory embodied in Watson's reply to his critics, see Alan
Watson, Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1136-
46 (1983).
185. I think that the basic strategy of these elites is that of "filling the gaps" in search
for legitimating authorities, to be found abroad if not available at home. This does not bar
the pursuit of more elaborate and politically motivated strategies. It represents just the
basic form of self-legitimization, and it is patently based on a hidden logic of prestige and
exclusion: legal systems are divided into prestigious and contemptible, and solutions are
borrowed from the former, and maybe transplanted to the latter. It is a kind of an
"alimental chain," maintained by the last in the chain. On the role of "prestige" in legal
borrowings, see Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative
Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1991).
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French philosophers, the dispersion of events may be seen as
ideologically packed in a unity by a biased genealogy, and by a
professional elite in search of legitimacy.
Such a reading of the theory of transplants, a theory promulgated
by Watson, one of the leading Romanists, can be used perfectly to
cope with the problem of continuity and discontinuity in legal
evolution, and so can be used against the conventional theories of
professional Romanists.
In these terms, if we adopt a Continuity approach186 to Roman
Law and the Western legal tradition, we can maintain that every new
piece of borrowing from abroad, or every apparent break with the
past is indeed a renewal of the old, or an original appraisal
transforming the former element into a purely Roman achievement.
If we adopt a view centered on the receiving country, we may always
maintain that genius may find its expression also in the readiness to
absorb and assimilate notions and techniques from the outside. It is
also certainly true that "[w]hen texts from one legal system are
received into another, the use made of the text in the recipient system
will be a function of the needs, values and system of meanings of the
latter, not the former."' 87 This is certainly true; because borrowing is
a creative and selective activity. But the point is exactly that the
system found inspiration abroad and so internal cultural strategies
could unfold because of the external "contact" or "contamination."
We cannot know if these systems would have succeeded otherwise.
It must be clear that this is not a problem of praising or blaming
the borrowing system. I don't blame it. I do not stamp it with a
badge of inferiority for having borrowed. If this be so, it is solely
because the Western legal historians choose to put that construction
upon it. For me it is just a question of source criticism.188 But if we
look for roots it is evident that it is important from whence the source
came, as well as why and how it was received. If genealogies are
produced by insulated elites for the sake of legitimization, hiding the
bundle-like nature of the legal systems, this represents a typical
exclusion through denial of unwelcome contacts with unwelcome
civilizations, civilizations to which we do not want to be indebted.
186. See supra note 164 and related text.
187. Bernard S. Jackson, Modeling Biblical Law: The Covenant Code, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1745, 1755 (1995).
188. See L.A. REYNOLDS & N.G. WILSON, SCRIBES AND SCHOLARS: A GUIDE TO
THE TRANSMISSION OF GREEK AND LATIN LrrERATURE 207 (Oxford, 3d ed. 1991),
according to whom "source criticism" is the tendency in ancient literature history where
the business is to follow back the threads of transmission and try to restore the texts as
closely as possible to their original form.
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H. A Critique of the Western Genius
A. Defamiliarizing the Western Family
My point about Discontinuity developed at the end of the first
part, supra, is peculiarly important in relation to the link between
modern European laws and ancient classical Roman Law. As we saw,
it has been the pivotal point of Zimmerman'8 9 to reaffirm this direct
descendance.
But the pattern of Discontinuity is shared, I think quite correctly,
by such eminent Roman Lawyers as Peter Stein,19° according to
whom Zimmerman's emphasis on the classical law militates against a
proper understanding of the roots of modem Civil Law.
If we share the framework notion of understanding adopted in
humanities, and discussed above in the previous section, we are freed
to look for the needs which the theory of uniqueness and continuity
of Roman Law satisfies. First of all, once Roman Law is viewed as
but a bundle of traits borrowed from abroad, it becomes just another
iteration of a broader Mediterranean law, and so it loses its special
place in modem legal studies. Second, if Roman Law is not a
continuing tradition from ancient times to present, it is patently false
to say that modern law is rooted in it. Too many breaks occurred in
history from Roman times to now. These breaks can be softened only
by the very "metaphysical" idea of an underlying evolving tradition
with changing details, but unchanged in its essence. Once again
Roman Law is to lose its special status in legal scholarship.
Then, recalling the reading of Watson's theory of elites in the
field of law set forth above, we can single out very special reasons to
maintain the Continuity Model: these reasons are strictly linked to
the survival of Romanists as professionals. They have a vested
interest in maintaining the Model, they are biased, and I think that
their special interest must be taken into account in judging alternative
theories and models.
Such particular interest of a sub-group is not without impact on
the general picture of the law. If modem Western law is to be rooted
on Roman uniqueness, we can still perceive Western legal history as a
unit evolving from Roman times through the Middle Ages to its
actual predominance as "the" modem law par excellence. Western
law split in two major families, Common Law and Civil Law, but
traditional British isolationism is now overwhelmed and quite
superseded by Comparative Law efforts to establish both the
189. See Zimmermann, supra note 47.
190. See Peter Stein, Reinhard Zimmermann's The Law of Obligations: Roman
Foundation of the Civilian Traditions, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 94 (1994) (book review).
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common origin and the present merging of the two families into one
system marked by local variances. 191 From this point of view it is true
that Comparative Law, coupled with traditional Roman-based legal
history, becomes a project of global cultural governance in the field of
law.192 A major strategy of this project is the exoticization of legal
cultures different from the Western one. Babylonian, Egyptian, and
Syrian law are exotic, whereas Roman Law is not, even if it was based
on slavery and a lot of magic. 193
Our view changes significantly if we simply abandon the
Continuity model and adopt a Discontinuity approach. 9 4 This
approach, which I link to modern ideas about interpretation and the
historical work, may also be justified with reference to Watson's
theory of legal transplants, as we did in the previous section, and to a
standard form of source criticism: a kind of critique normally
adopted outside legal history.195
The Discontinuity model presents a theory that Roman Law (I
would say as every law) comes from a number of different sources,
and that it was carried out over a period of many centuries by persons
who had various motives and who culled and patched and rewrote
and amplified past records for newer purposes. The work thus
produced is not a coherent and unified tradition evolved from
"original" sources, but from a series of various institutional settings,
and different cultural landscapes. These different settings and their
different sources are in dispersion, which the condense-evolutionary
model try to manage by denying the dispersion as well as the breaks.
From this viewpoint, the "renewal" of Roman Law through the
ages does not demonstrate a peculiar capacity in Roman Law itself,
but rather the peculiar capacity of later lawyers, especially in the Civil
law, to adopt newer rules and solutions and to attach them to the
authority of the old Roman texts. 96 Coptic, Ethiopian, or Chinese
texts would have worked as well. The "recall to Rome" does not
reflect the quality of Roman products, but the strategy of
191. See the critique of the mainstream theory in Pierre Legrand, European Legal
Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996).
192. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 581.
193. See discussion infra Part II.B (entitled "Contract, Magic and Exotic").
194. See FOUCAULT, supra note 164 and related text.
195. On source criticism, see REYNOLDS & WILSON, supra note 188. See also JOHN B.
GABEL & CHARLES B. WHEELER, THE BIBLE AS LITERATURE 84-87 (2d ed. 1990).
Source criticism is now seen even as quite outdated in these areas of study; see the various
approaches used in GEORGE AICHELE ET AL., THE POSTMODERN BIBLE: THE BIBLE
AND CULTURE COLLECrIVE (1995); but it can still be effectively used as a weapon of
critique in the old- fashioned province of legal history.
196. On the transformation of Justinian Roman Law by later European lawyers, see
BERMAN, supra note 4, at 129.
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legitimization that dominated in Europe.
The shift in approach I suggest here has various consequences for
the "ideology" of Western law. The first is that Western law is a
patchwork no less exotic than others. The second is that Western law
is derived not only from Roman Law, but from other ancient laws as
well. This suggests a more globalized view of Western institutions,
and of their origins. Indeed, it intimates that "Western" law is not
nearly so "Western" as we have been led to believe.
My strategy in this second half of the work is to critique current
"ideological" accounts of Roman Law by showing its "primitivism,"
stressing its exoticism, and displaying how much its original characters
were foreign to the present Western mind. I demonstrate that, even
when held up to the standards adopted by those who praise it, Roman
Law is defective. Indeed the best way to undercut a rival theory is to
rely on the same tenets. For this I rely sometimes even on old
evolutionary patterns to show the contradictions in traditional
literature when Roman greatness is at stake.
My argument is centered upon few but central examples: the
theory of contracts, that of the State, the settling of disputes, and the
role of professional elites in shaping the legal culture in ancient times.
In so doing I can rely on accepted views of legal historians
showing that a radical critique can be based on their own accounts,
merely by abandoning their biases. Thus it is not necessary to rely
upon new theories, or new findings, but simply to employ a new
reading of the available doctrines.
(1) Rome and the West
Here I sketch a basic account of Roman legal history, something
which is not properly part of the argument but which must be
outlined here to orient the reader to what follows. I rely
predominantly on the standard account made by the well-known
expert in Roman Law, O.F. Robinson. 197
Tradition has it that Rome was founded in 753 B.C.E. and ended
with the death of the Emperor Justinian at 565 C.E.. This span of
roughly "[t]hirteen centuries may be conveniently divided into four
basic periods: The Monarchy, the Republic, the Principate, and the
Dominate.' 198 The opening of the second, third and fourth periods
are marked by violent crisis which gave birth to new arrangements.
The times of Monarchy are too far remote and obscured by
fabulous stories, and do not pertain directly to the history we deal
with here. Nevertheless, under the constitutional arrangement of this
197. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 3.
198. J.A.C. THOMAS, TEXTBOOK OF ROMAN LAW 13 (1976).
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period we find three basic elements: the king, who was supreme
magistrate, the chief priest, chief judge and commander in chief, the
Senate, which was the assembly of the heads of noble clans, and the
popular assembly, which was the group of all freemen apt to serve in
the army. Our story begins later when this arrangement was already
entirely superseded by a new republican constitution.
According to the standard presentation supplied by Robinson,
from 366 B.C.E. until the last century B.C.E., the Roman constitution
was stable in the form of an aristocratic republic with three basic
elements: magistrates, Senate and people. 99 But the whole republic
was essentially dominated by a few important families still shaped in a
clanic framework.2°° The magistrates exercised the executive and
administrative power, they were elected annually, and each
magistracy was collegiate. The Senate was an advisory assembly
composed by the heads of the great families and of former
magistrates. The people, namely all male adult citizens, met when
summoned by magistrates in various assemblies, elected the new
magistrates, and passed or rejected laws proposed to them.
Jurisdiction over citizens was the job of the Praetor.201 After 242
B.C.E., a second Praetor was created to deal with cases involving
foreigners. It is remarkable to note that these institutions were
properly the institutions of the city of Rome, and that, though
ultimately adapted to the role of governing an Empire, until the Late
Empire Rome remained essentially an enlarged city-state.
Beginning in 133 B.C.E., a major revolution occurred within
Roman society due to many factors beyond the scope of this work.2°2
For our purposes it is enough to recall that the old clanic arrangement
collapsed and that a single clan, the gens Julia, to which Caesar
belonged, emerged as a ruling family.2 3  Augustus, the first
"emperor" to emerge, made a new constitutional settlement marking
the start of the Principate.2°4 "In this period the assemblies, the
Senate and the magistracies all continued in theory to function as they
had before. '205 No new theory of government was erected and the
"emperor" formally remained one of the magistrates, the first in
preeminence among the senators. (Princeps senatus from whence
199. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 3.
200. See PARENTA ET STRAT-GIES FAMILIALES DANS L'ANTIQUIT ROMAINE
[KINSHIP AND FAMILY STRATEGIES IN ANCIENT ROME] 254 (Ecole francaise de Rome, J.
Andreau & H. Bruhns eds. 1990) (plunging the Roman family system into a wider
Mediterranean common scheme).
201. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 3.
202. See P.A. BUNT, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC (1988).
203. See RONALD SYME, THE AUGUSTIAN ARISTOCRACY (1986).
204. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 9.
205. Id. at 10.
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comes the label of "Principate" used to denote the period). The
emperor was also the commander of a more or less reluctant army.
Though lacking the formal assumption of fresh legal powers, imperial
authority penetrated all departments of government, and, above all,
the new system was recognized as normal and necessary.
In 212 C.E., the Antoninian Constitution extended Roman
citizenship to all the inhabitants of the Empire, and the old city
structure collapsed. This fact was of great importance.2°6 We shall
often refer to it as the Globalization of Roman Law. Until 212 C.E.
Roman Law was indeed the law of the Romans alone, and other
peoples of the Empire lived to a great extent under their own national
systems. After, Roman Law was globalized and it really became the
legal framework of the whole empire, but it came to be reframed on
new basis.
The third century was a period of economic and political
turbulence. 2 7 "In the first 262 years of Roman rule there were some
twenty-five emperors, and then in the next 50 years a further twenty-
one. 208 In this century Roman power was a closed system, and as
major immigrations of German tribes infiltrated the West, the
Eastern part of the Empire increasingly assumed more economic and
political prevalence. We shall often refer to this crisis as the Great
Crisis of the third century, or the Great Crisis alone. It marked a
major break in Roman history.209
At the end of the century, an IllirianMt ° general, Diocletian (284-
305 C.E.), restored a central authority on a new constitutional basis,
starting the period of the Dominate.21' He transformed the imperial
power into a sacred monarchy with a strong central bureaucracy, and
even removed the capital from Rome.212 Diocletian tried to ground
the monarchy on the old religion but, seven years after his death, in
312 C.E., Constantine the Great preferred to rely on the new
Christian faith213 which had spread among the Greek-speaking elites
of the Eastern part,2 14 and he finally founded a New Rome at
206. See Wolfgang Liebeschuetz, The End of the Ancient City, in THE CITY IN LATE
ANTIQUITY 4 (John Rich ed., 1992).
207. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 2.
208. 1&
209. See PETER BROWN, THE MAKING OF LATE ANTIQUITY 2 (1978) (arguing that the
third century B.C.E. must lie at the center of any account of late Roman history).
210. The Roman province of Illiria covered approximately the area of the former
Yugoslavia.
211. See STEPHEN WILLIAMS, DIOCLETIAN AND THE ROMAN RECOVERY (1985).
212. See id. at 41.
213. See ANDREW ALFLDI, THE CONVERSION OF CONSTANTINE AND PAGAN ROME
(Harold Mattingly trans., 1948). On the advent of Christianity within the imperial
structure, see also R. MCMULLEN, CHANGES IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE 124-55 (1990).
214. See PETER BROWN, AUTHORITY AND THE SACRED ASPECTS OF THE
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Constantinople, present Istanbul, on a peninsula between Europe and
Asia. The Latin-speaking West, whose armies were in practice made
up of Germans, and whose religion became Catholic, was finally
separated from the Greek-speaking orthodox East in 395 C.E. at the
death of Emperor Theodosius. After some decades, starting from 476
C.E., the German generals governing the Western armies 15 no
longer assumed the imperial title,216 and the empire split into various
new "European" kingdoms. The Eastern part, reorganized by
Justinian, lasted for another 1,000 years, until the Turks ultimately
conquered Constantinople.
(2) Egypt and the East
As in the previous section I gave a brief sketch of Roman legal
history, here I do the same for the other Mediterranean laws involved
in the argument, and especially for Egyptian law because of its
peculiar relevance. This brief account is not properly part of the
argument, but is restricted to notions relevant to this work.
"Mediterranean" as a geographic region can well be used also as
a spatial concept of common historical evolution of different peoples,
from the general217 as well as from the legal point of view.218 The
sphere of Ancient Mediterranean law is huge, covering more than
three thousand years of history.219
Egyptian ancient history can be divided conveniently into three
basic dynastic periods: the Old (2695-2160 B.C.E.), Middle (1991-
1785 B.C.E.) and New (1540-1070) Kingdoms.220 After that date, the
history of the country was marked by invasions from other peoples,
and the kingdom become absorbed into the Persian Empire, until this
empire was in turn conquered by the Greeks led by Alexander the
Great. This, in 332 B.C.E., started the so-called Ptolemaic period,
named for Alexander's general Ptolomaeus, who became king after
Alexander's death.
CHRISTIANISATION OF THE ROMAN WORLD 3 (1995).
215. I do not delve into the investigations on the final ruin of the Western empire. For
a complete review of the most important theories, see THE FALL OF ROME: CAN IT BE
EXPLAINED? (Mortimer Chambers ed., 1963).
216. Remember that in Latin the title "emperor" merely meant commander-in-chief of
an army.
217. See generally FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN WORLD IN THE AGE OF PHILIP II (Sian Reynolds trans., 1972).
218. See WALTER SELB, ANTIKE RECHTE IM MITELMEERRAUM: ROM,
GRIECHENLAND, &GYPTEN UND DER ORIENT [ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN LAWS]
(1993).
219. Geoffrey P. Miller, Foreword- The Development of Ancient Near Eastern Law, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1623,1623 (1995).
220. See BARRY J. KEMP, ANCIENT EGYPT: ANATOMY OF A CIVILIZATION 14 (1989).
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The literature on law in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean,
including the African coast where Egypt lies,221 has been growing
quite slowly during this century with the appearance of some
European essays,2 2 2 Pirenne's three-volume Treatise on Egyptian
law,223 the contributions of Aristide Th6oridorids, 224 and some
comparative analyses which have focused in particular on Jewish
law.225 Finally, we are now seeking a revival of the subject in the
American literature,226 which has displayed a growing interest in legal
institutions in the region.
Ancient Egypt is defined as a water-based society centered on a
desert floodplain.227 Egypt arose as a state by coordinating large-
scale economic projects, public works, and the production of
bronze, the strongest known metal of the time. All this required a
strong central administrative organization. Generally, though, the
ancient Egyptians are not regarded as contributing a great deal to
jurisprudence. Yet the fact is that there are numerous legal
documents among the earliest extant Hieratic papyri.229 Throughout
the various dynastic periods we find legal instruments. Here and there
221. For a bibliography until 1945 of works in English, see ADOLF BERGER & A.
ARTHUR SCHILLER, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN STUDIES IN ROMAN,
GREEK, AND GRECO-EGYPTIAN LAW AND RELATED SCIENCES, 1939-45 (1945).
222. See, e.g., ERWIN SEIDL, AGYPrISCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE DER SAITEN-UND
PERSERZEIT [EGYPTIAN LEGAL HISTORY] (Glueckstadt, J.J. Augustus, 2d ed. 1968);
BERNADETTE MENU, DROIT, ECONOMIE, ET SOCIETE DE L'EGYPTE ANCIENNE:
CHRONIQUE BIBLIOGRAPHIQUE, 1967-1982 [LAW AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT EGYPT: A
BIBLIOGRAPHY] (1984); BERNADETTE MENU, RECHERCHES SUR L' HISTOIRE
JURIDIQUE, ECONOMIQUE ET SOCIALE DE L'ANCIENNE EGYPTE [LEGAL, ECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF ANCIENT EGYPT] (1982).
223. See JACQUES PIRENNE, HISTOIRE DES INSTITUTIONS ET DU DROIT PRIV DE
L'ANCIEN EGYPTE [HISTORY OF ANCIENT EGYPTIAN LAW] (1932); see also JACQUES
PIRENNE & ARISTIDE TH _ODORIDtS, DROIT EGYPTIEN [EGYPTIAN LAW](1966).
224. See, e.g., Aristide Th6oridoridis, The Concept of Law in Ancient Egypt, in THE
LEGACY OF EGYPT 290 (J.R. Harris ed., 2d ed. 1971).
225. See, e.g., JACOB J. RABINOWITZ, STUDIES IN LEGAL HISTORY (1958) (comparing
Jewish and Egyptian law).
226. See, e.g., Ross VerSteeg, Law in Ancient Egyptian Fiction, 24 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 37 (1994); CRUZ-URIBE, supra note 141; David Barrington Taylor, Law Under
the Pharaohs, 6 POL'Y L. REV. 66 (1980). For a comparative perspective, see Robert C.
Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321 (1996).
227. See KARL W. BUTZER, EARLY HYDRAULIC CIVILIZATION IN EGYPT: A STUDY
IN CULTURAL ECOLOGY xii-xv (1976); see also Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 226, at
332.
228. See KARL A. WITrFOGEL, ORIENTAL DESPOTISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
TOTAL POWER 49-100 (1957); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF
JUSTICE 144 (1981).
229. THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, TEN COPTIC LEGAL 3 (A. Arthur
Schiller ed., 1932).
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are record of cases; and a code of laws is mentioned as early as the
Middle Kingdom.P0 Thanks to cuneiform records, evidence of the
history of law in the ancient Middle East now extends back to the
early third millenium, and the very earliest records reveal a highly
organized legal system.3 1 Indeed there is no better documented
ancient system than Egypt's. We are provided with a rich and
detailed array of primary sources displaying an articulated practice of
both public and private law232  We can now speak of a highly
developed legal system evolving steadily over many generations.23
3
Our present knowledge of law in ancient Egypt is based on
Hieroglyphic, Hieratic, Demotic, Aramaic, and Coptic documents.
Hieroglyphic was the Egyptian script first attested in the late fourth
millenium. Hieratic is the script gradually developed from
Hieroglyphic about 2500 B.C.E., changing the formal pictorial
Hieroglyphic into a cursive script. Demotic is the script that was
developed for the rapid writing of legal and business documents after
650 B.C.E..2 4  Aramaic, which is peculiarly important for a
comparison of law in antiquity,25 was a West Semitic language,
originally spoken in parts of what is now Syria, that became the lingua
franca of the Assyrian, Neo-Babylonian and much of the Persian
empires. It replaced the Caananite dialects and Hebrew in the East
Mediterranean during the middle of the first millenium B.C.E.. Thus
many of the documents written in Aramaic reflect broad commercial
practices of developed business law.
Coptic, which came much later, was the language of the Christian
inhabitants of Egypt until the late Middle Ages. Coptic law from a
comparative point of view is almost unique. It represents the last
stage of a mixture of legal systems that were in existence for five
thousand years. Coptic law began with the Arab conquest (641 C.E.)
extending to about the tenth century C.E., when Arabic law
supplanted it. There are many hundreds of Coptic texts, and
therefore the documentary evidence we have to rely on is plentiful.P
6
In various different instances, Coptic documents can give us
230. See W.M. FLINDERS PETRIE, SOCIAL LIFE IN ANCIENT EGYPT 77 (1923).
231. Raymond Westbrook, "What is the Covenant Code?", in THEORY AND METHOD
IN BIBLICAL AND CUNEIFORM LAW: REVISION, INTERPOLATION AND DEVELOPMENT
15,20 (Bernard M. Levinson ed., 1994).
232. J.G. Manning, Demotic Egyptian Instruments of Transfer as Evidence for Private
Ownership of Real Property, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 237,237 (1995).
233. See Nili Shupak, A New Source for the Study of the Judiciary and Law of Ancient
Egypt: "The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant", 51 J. NEAR E. STUD. 1 (1992).
234. See GEORGE R. HUGHES, SArrE DEMOTIC LAND LEASES 46 (1952).
235. See REUVEN YARON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARAMAIC PAPYRI (1961)
(comparing Jewish law and the law of Egypt).
236. See THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM OF ART, supra note 229, at 3.
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information about very old practices. For instance, the institution of
sale in ancient Egypt, prior to the conquest of the Romans, but
preserved by them, is the foundation of the institution among the
Copts.23 7
Two periods will be of special interest in the ongoing argument:
the Ptolemaic period and the period of Greco-Roman Egypt.
The Egyptian Ptolemaic period corresponds to a broader
Mediterranean framework of civilization which is known as
Hellenism, and which represents a complex fusion of Greek, Near-
Eastern and Egyptian patterns. Hellenistic Kingdoms, including the
Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt, came to an end when Rome took over
the entire area in the last decades B.C.E. at the very foundation of the
Principate at the time of Emperor Augustus.238 Thus Hellenism is
crucial in the passing from ancient to Romanized Egypt, and of
course relevant from the standpoint of a theory of possible legal
transplants.
Hellenism is indeed a biased word. The word was invented by
John Gustavus Droysen in 1831 in a letter to his Belgian friend W.A.
Arendt.239 The subject of the letter was an interpretation of the Acts
of the Apostles (6:1) where mention is made of a split in the Christian
community of Jerusalem. The "Hellenists" in the community were
murmuring against the "Hebrews," and Droysen understood the
former to be Oriental Greeks, while it is now clear that Paul meant to
contrast the "Jews speaking Greek" with the "Jews speaking Hebrew
or Aramaic." But five years later, in 1836, Droyesen's Geschichte des
Hellenismus [A History of Hellenism] made this solecism a received
truth. It is quite clear that the term Hellenism emphasizes the role of
the Greek elites and correspondingly denies the contributions of non-
Greek cultures.
Such a terminological confusion goes right to the root of the
matter: Hellenism has been defined as the era in which Greek culture
spread eastwards to India, an assertion open to serious question.240
As we saw, when Alexander died his generals succeeded him and split
the immense territory they conquered into different kingdoms. But
the whole of these realms formed a common civilization based on a
newer common culture. This process has been labeled
"Synchretism," 241 a word derived from the Greek, denoting the
237. See id- at 4.
238. See ERICH S. GRUEN, THE HELLENISTIC WORLD AND THE COMING OF ROME
(1984).
239. See MICHAEL AvI-YORAN, HELLENISM AND THE EAST: CONTACTS AND
INTERRELATIONS FROM ALEXANDER TO THE ROMAN CONQUEST 1 (1978).
240. See iL at 3.
241. SIR WILLIAM TARN & G.T. GRIFFrrH, HELLENISTIC CIVILIZATION 339 (3d ed.
1952) (a classic scholarly work on this subject).
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gathering together of different patterns. Indeed the model of
historical reconstruction today prevailing in Anglo-American
literature is that of interaction between Greek and African-Asian
patterns.242 The two principal carriers of Hellenism were language
and institutions: a simplified form of Greek language known as the
"Koine" became the lingua franca of this empire and remained so
even after the Roman conquests. 243 The Eastern part of the Roman
empire always had Greek, not Latin, as its common language. The
problem is, from where did the common institutions of this amalgam
culture come? Now that we have sketched a bit the units of the
narrative we can delve into the examples we have chosen to contrast
Roman and African-Mediterranean laws.
We shall commence by considering the magic and defects of
Roman Law of contracts, and then the practice of Egypt and Middle
Eastern countries. Then we shall discuss the rise of the State.
B. Contract, Magic and the Exotic
The domain of contract is of peculiar interest to our inquiry since
no part of Roman Law has been so admired or so influential as the
law of contracts.244 And it is indeed this portion of Roman legal skill
that is proposed still today as a ground for a new common European
legal framework.245
Notwithstanding such shared admiration, even Watson concedes
that we can properly criticize Roman contract law for major defects
which lasted for centuries and of which Roman Lawyers were aware,
or at least ought to have been aware.246
First of all, the Romans never developed either a general theory
of contract, nor a law of contract; they confined themselves to a law of
individual contracts.247 It is thus apparent that the Civil Law tradition
moved in the opposite direction from original Roman Law.
Traditional Romanists typically try to deny this defect, even as they
must acknowledge that it is one. For instance, Buckland and McNair
concede that "in Roman Law a general law of contract.., has had to
be collected and brought to the surface in modem times. It is at best
latent in the ancient books. The jurists dealt almost exclusively with
242. See, e.g., HELLENISM IN THE EAST: THE INTERACTION OF GREEK AND NON-
GREEK CIVILIZATIONS FROM SYRIA TO CENTRAL ASIA AFTER ALEXANDER (Am6lie
Kuhrt & Susan Sherwin-White eds., 1987).
243. See GABEL, supra note 36, at 148.
244. I quote directly from ALAN WATSON, SOCIETY, supra note 16, at 12.
245. See Zimmermann, supra note 47, at 148.
246. See WATSON, SOCIETY, supra note 16, at 12.
247. See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 129 (asserting that it was the later European jurists
who made a theory of contract law out of particular types of Roman contracts).
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various particular contracts." 248 What does it mean that something is
"at best latent" in ancient books and "had to be collected in modem
times"? It is quite clear that contract theory never existed for the
Romans, and that it was built, by collection, in modern times. Notice
that this is the reasonable result of applying a plain kind of source
criticism,249 as it is used elsewhere except in the field of legal history.
It is also clear that such a denial of historical criticism can be
explained only by the existence of a constraining discourse whose
principal interest is the exclusion of standard criticism when Roman
greatness is at stake. We can also perceive the difference between
adopting a continuity model or a more sound and plain dis-continuity
approach. If we use the former we can say that something brought to
the surface in modern times was latent in the Roman books, which is
meaningless from a standard historical criticism, as if we would bring
to the surface some Roman religious belief that remained latent for
the Romans themselves. If we adopt the latter approach it becomes
evident that a general law of contract is a modern achievement,
eventually legitimated by reference to some Roman text.
Buckland and McNair go even further, citing the fact that
although the Roman jurists dealt exclusively with the particular
contracts, they "regularly" made use of analogies from other
contracts, 250 as "proof" of the existence of a latent wider theory. It is
to me extraordinary that such reasoning has never been subjected to
withering critique. It is exactly the necessity of using analogies from
other contracts that proves the lack of a general theory, whereas this
use does not really mean anything more than that all contracts were
contracts. Certainly the Romans perceived the various contracts as
similar, since they used for them the same label, but they never went
further, as is confirmed by the necessity of the use of analogy, which
properly means similarity without identity. The jurists just saw
analogies, namely parallel resemblances among the contracts, and
that is all. The "denial" of this fact is much more interesting, and we
shall return to it.
So we must examine particular contracts precisely because of the
lack of a law of contract in Roman jurisprudence.251 I select two of
the instances dealt with by Watson because of their importance: the
oldest of Roman contracts, the stipulatio, and the sale. Both also have
been much discussed in modem literature. The former can make
248. W.W. BUCKLAND & ARNOLD D. McNAMR, ROMAN LAW & COMMON LAW: A
COMPARISON IN OUTLINE 265 (F.H. Lawson ed., 2d ed. 1965) (emphasis added).
249. See REYNOLDS & WILSON, supra note 188 and related text.
250. Id.
251. Hereinafter I rely on the same analysis worked out by WATSON, SOCIETY, supra
note 16, at 13-15.
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clear the exotic and magic pervading ancient Roman Law as well as
other ancient laws, and the latter can display proper technical defects
of Roman legal thought. Once again we can rely on Watson to
strengthen our theory.
In the case of stipulatio, the contract was formed by question and
answer:252 "Do you promise?" "I do so promise." The parties had to
be face to face, and formalities had to be followed precisely.253 Only
one verb could be used, "Spondesne ... ?", "Spondeo." No other
verb produced a legal effect. It is not difficult to see at work here a
belief in the magic of a word. Exactly that word, and that word alone,
can be effective. It is true that later Roman Law evolved to abolish
such verbal solemnity, but it lasted for centuries. 254 We can stress the
change, or we can point to the original magic form. But to stress the
change is a not-too-orthodox move when one is pleading the
superiority of an original system.25s How can we claim such a
superiority by praising the fact that the system finally evolved away
from its very premises?
To make clear that formalities in the stipulatio were purely magic
and exotic we can consider that formalities in contracts have two basic
functions. They mark the end of negotiations, and they provide
evidence for the contract and its terms. Yet formalities for stipulatio
perform only the first function and not also the second. This grave
weakness of the stipulatio was well-known to the Romans, yet it was
never directly remedied.
Though the early history of this contract is obscure, its sacred
character, and also its defects as a legal device, can be traced back,
according to many scholars, to the very use of the verb spondeo,
which derives from a Greek verb meaning "I make a drink
offering,"256 which marked a kind of an oath, and since a Roman oath
was the calling of a god to witness, there was no need of other
evidence about the terms of the contract. This form of sacred oath
became a legal tool but the jurists were not able to correct it.
The second example concerns the law of sale. For the Romans it
was a consensual contract, so that it was valid simply because of the
agreement of the parties, without any requirement of form. Although
these contracts are presented as "one of the great Roman
inventions, ''257 we must recall that there were only four consensual
252. See J. INST. 3.15.
253. For this account of Roman contract law see WATSON, SOCIETY, supra note 16, at
12-15.
254. See Ud
255. See iU2
256. See id at 15.
257. Id at 14.
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contracts: sale, hire, partnership and mandate, which is not too many
for a highly-developed system of contracts.
The major defect of Roman sale was the lack of inherent
warranties. The buyer could not rely on the worthiness of the seller's
title. Nor was the seller held to give an implied warranty that the item
sold was free from serious latent defects, except when the sale was
made in the market-place and concerned a slave or a beast of burden.
The jurists tried to develop a general liability of the seller, but this
process was still in its infancy in the classical period. The buyer could
build protection for interests only by making stipulations with the
seller, and hundreds of texts show that this was commonly done. But
then in practice a sale transaction would cease to have the advantages
of a consensual contract, and the parties would need to be face-to-
face and make resort to the magic we have reported.
Like Watson, we can wonder if the concept of inherent warranty
was too refined or advanced for the Romans: "The straight answer is
No!" 8  For example, according to Watson's account an inherent
warranty against eviction was contained in the mancipatio, another
magic ceremony259 required to transfer the property on land.
It is thus clear that the contract of sale was essentially confined to
the sale of goods by letter or messenger, without the parties meeting.
However, the impossibility of creating warranties other than by
stipulation could make it more difficult for a seller to get a reasonable
price for his goods. Where a stipulation could not be taken a
merchant might well hesitate to buy at distance. The failure to have
inherent warranties in the contract of sale "[c]ut down many of the
advantages of the contract. ''26°
I think that this account is peculiar for a critical appraisal of
Roman Law. It is also peculiar for the pro-Roman bias shared even
by such eminent scholars as Watson. In his book, Watson relies
mostly on examples derived from Roman Law, and early English law,
to elaborate a general theory of disharmony between private law and
the needs and desires of society, making implausible the existing
theories of legal development and of the relationship between law
and society. Here we can see at work a typical bias: if Roman Law,
and even the Glorious Early Common Law, was defective, then "The
Law" itself is necessarily defective. This bias does not allow for the
simpler theory placed within our grasp by Watson's findings: Roman
258. 1& at 14-15.
259. See id at 15. Mancipatio is a kind of symbolic sale, requiring the two parties
(transferor and transferee), five witnesses, a pair of scales, and a piece of bronze. The
transferee had to solemnly assert his property on the thing, and to strike the scales with
the piece of bronze. See JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 143-44.
260. WATSON, SOCIETY, supra note 16, at 15.
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Law (and eventually early English law as well) had a peculiar capacity
to evolve and cope with serious organizational problems, at least up
to the end of the second century C.E. when the original character of it
was finally lost in favor of the more progressive and well-developed
law of the provinces.26' The major defect here lies in the capacity of
Roman jurists to shape new forms better fit for society. The same can
be repeated for the English examples cited by Watson: probably the
defect lies in the Western professional 61ites, as we suggested above.
Whereas I think that Watson's theory of 6ites is correct, I presume
that his theory goes too far when depicting an inherent nature of the
Law as an autonomous realm. It is peculiarly the Roman and later
Western law based on professional insulated 61ites which suffer such
defects.
I think that the primitivism of the Roman Law of contracts can
be better perceived when we compare it to other ancient
Mediterranean laws.
In order to underscore the primitivism and exoticism of Roman
Law, we have to treat the matter within the framework that was
created after Hellenism. As we said before, the Greco-Roman period
of Egyptian civilization is indeed of crucial importance since it is
coexistent with Roman classical law. And since we must recall that,
in accordance with the principle of personality, which was
predominant in antiquity, Egyptian law prevailed in Egypt for the
Egyptian people,262 just as the Greek population was subject to Greek
law.263 So the two legal systems of Egypt and Rome were closed to
one another for some centuries. In fact, there can be no doubt that
Egyptian law was still operating during the Roman era, during which
the indigenous Egyptians continued to form a separate group from
the Hellenes living, as in the Ptolemaic epoch, under its native law.
What is amazing is that Egyptian national law remained in force even
after the Antoninian Constitution.264  This suggests a peculiar
independence and persistence of this system of law, so that Egyptian
institutions survived and had eventually some influence on
contemporary Roman practice. Besides, the Roman administration
attained the legislation of the autonomous cities such as Alexandria,
one of the major cultural centers of the ancient world.265 So both in
the Ptolemaic and Roman eras a clear distinction was made between
261. See infra pp. 549-55.
262. See RAPHAEL TAUBENSCHLAG, THE LAW OF GREcO-ROMAN EGYPT IN THE
LIGHT OF THE PAPYRI 332 B.C.E.-640 C.E. 2 (2d ed. 1955). I prefer to quote from the
first edition to stress the date of its findings, largely understated or ignored among the
Romanists.
263. See id. at 5-6.
264. See id at 7.
265. On the cultural relevance of Alexandria, see GABEL, supra note 36, at 148-49.
March 2000] BLACK GAIUS
Greek and Egyptian law and a system of rules of conflicts between
the two laws was developed to cope with practical issues. In the
domain of contracts, the principle was that the language in which the
document was written determined the governing law. 266 Parties could
then decide to use Roman, Greek or Egyptian law by framing the
agreement in the chosen language. An advantage was given to Greek
law in criminal cases, because if the matter at issue involved members
of various nationalities it was Greek (not Roman) law which was to
be exclusively applied.
The question of mutual influence of Greek, Roman and Egyptian
law is highly complex. What scholars have traced is that many
contractual clauses, especially in the field of guarantees, were copied
from Egyptian institutions, resulting in the formation of a law
composed of elements of all three systems.267 This is particularly
important for our argument since we have seen in the previous
section that even relying on Romanists' accounts the law of
guarantees in the Roman Law of sale and commercial transactions
was quite poor. Defects of Roman Law could survive, despite being
out of step with the needs of society, because private parties could
decide to use other systems of law. Roman Law was, then, the law of
Roman citizens, but Romans could also use other laws.
I think that it is important to notice that we are not referring here
to new findings, but to facts known at least from the end of the last
War. We are simply making a foreground/background shift, a critical
move which alters the meaning of available data. If we study Roman
Law, not as an insulated system, according to the old German
paradigm, but as one among other systems of law in the
Mediterranean basin, we immediately reach a very different view of
the entire subject. Roman Law was the law of a restricted group,
bound to old forms, but it was not the law of the Empire. Quite
certainly it was not the most relied-upon law for commercial
transactions, especially in the most economically developed regions of
the old Mediterranean world, the African coasts and the Near East.
From this viewpoint, the overwhelming importance attributed to
Roman Law in law schools in the West seems peculiarly ideological,
and out of step with reality.
After the Great Crisis of the third century, 268 we find in Egypt
fragments of the works of the major Jurists, or scholars in Roman
Law: Gaius, Paulus, Papinian and Ulpian,2 69 even though the
Egyptian system remained in force after the Antoninian Constitution.
266. See TAUBENSCHLAG, supra note 262, at 19-20.
267. See i& at 21-27.
268. See infra Part II.F (entitled "Redaction and Deromanization").
269. See TAUBENSCHLAG, supra note 262, at 26-27.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
This fact shows a cultural activity in legal scholarship which suggests
that a foundation was laid in Egypt for a Roman Law of provincial
character. It is important to note that it was largely a cultural
movement since on the whole imperial legislation was rarely imposed
on local peregrine law. From this movement there emerged a
mingled system, if we are to rely on Taubeshlag's unbiased
acknowledgment that the gradual Romanization of the local law has
been counterbalanced by a similar "Hellenization" of the Roman
Law.270 We can also note that his acknowledgement does not give full
credit due to Egypt since he refers to Hellenism, with a subsequent
emphasis on (Indo-European) Greek components. In any case, we
can state after him that in advanced fields such as commercial law the
influence of "Hellenistic" law on Roman Law was "powerful" and of
"paramount importance." This influence can be observed in the
development of principles of contracts in favor of third parties, and in
the fact that the rules on assignments and the law of independent
contractors developed in Greco-Egyptian law were finally raised by
Justinian to the level of imperial law.27'
Until now we have made reference to a late period of Egyptian
law, but if we look back to previous times on the basis of recent
literature, we find an already well-established system of contract even
in the Egyptian dynastic periods. 272 From the very end of the last
century it has been well known among specialists that the historical
record preserved a number of contracts, which have been described
by Erman as all couched in the same strictly regular form:
Contract concluded between A and B,
that B should give x to A,
whilst A should give y to B.
Behold, B was therewith content.273
In contrast with Roman practice, this form really looks like a
modem contract. It is written, it displays consideration, and there is
no magic. We feel it is not exotic, whereas Roman stipulation has
nothing in common with our legal conceptions. This feeling grows
stronger still if we examine the details of old documents. The clauses
dealing with transfer of property are normally of the following
form:274
"I have sold it to you for silver"
270. Id. at 46.
271. See id at 51.
272. See ADOLF ERMAN & HERMANN RANKE, LA CIVILISATION EGYPTIENNE
[EGYPTIAN CIVILIZATION] 196 (French trans. Paris, Payot & Rivagles, 1994).
273. VerSteeg, supra note 226, at 66.
274. CRUZ-URIBE, supra note 155, at 43 (providing a precise account of the documents,
and the correct transliteration of the Egyptian text).
March 2000] BLACK GAIUS
"I have given it to you for silver"
"I have given to you the cow together with her offspring"
If a Roman were to transfer property on a cow, instead of
drawing up a document with standard forms, clearly stating the
consideration of the bargain in a modern-like rational approach, he
had to be face to face with the other party, and to recite a kind of a
little drama in the presence of five witnesses: the mancipatio.275 He
also required a pair of scales and another citizen to hold them, and a
piece of copper. The ceremony consisted in the transferee's grasping
the thing to be transferred, or a part of it to magically symbolize its
presence, and saying "I assert that this thing is mine according to the
Law of the Romans, and be it bought to me with this piece of copper
and these copper scales." Then he had to strike the scales with the
piece of copper and to give it to the transferor "by way of price."
Notice that the piece of copper had no connection with the real price
even if there has been a preceding sale. It was given equally when
there was no sale at all. It was a piece of magic. Moreover, if the
parties made some mistake in the symbolic drama no property was
transferred. Such was the ceremony in the classical age! It is quite
amazing to note that the Romanists praise the requirement that five
witnesses be present as a method to prevent future disputes,276 as if a
written document would have not worked better. Besides, whereas in
ancient Egypt a written document could easily testify to the transfer
of possession, a Roman citizen, in case of a transfer of land, for
example, had to walk on the land to take possession!2- And the
evolution through which he had no longer to walk on the whole land,
but just to jump on a clod is considered a major achievement of the
Roman genius for legal affairs! Given this comparison between the
two systems, I think that ancient law scholars are a bit too shy in
affirming that the Egyptian conceptualization of law was "certainly"
not the same as the Roman, although the Egyptian legal system was
appropriately sophisticated for an advanced culture 278
What we say of Egypt could hold as well for other ancient Near-
Eastern laws. For instance, we found a well-developed system to
calculate interest and compound interest in Assyrian Law279 never
found in Roman Law; as well as a developed system of tablet
275. See supra note 229 and accompanying text; see also JOLOWICZ, supra note 126, at
143-49.
276. See JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 145.
277. See id. at 152-53 (discussing the transfer of possession in relation to conveyance of
land).
278. CRUZ-URIBE, supra note 155, at 101 (emphasis added).
279. See Klaas R. Veenhof, "In Accordance with the Words of the Stele": Evidence for
Old Assyrian Legislation, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1717,1722-24 (1995).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
recording of debts as negotiable instruments to cover guarantees8 0
In addition, merchant caravans were organized as single business
units where all expenses, taxes, losses and profits from the sales were
added and apportioned among the participants,281 an achievement
that was reached in Europe only during the middle ages.= Today we
also know of a mature legal system in Sumer,.83 and indeed the basic
pattern of contractual transactions found in Sumerian legal
documents of the third millenium survives throughout the cuneiform
record into Aramaic and Demotic documents.2s4
We have not the space to discuss this matter in detail, but if we
today compare the development of Roman Law with that of Egyptian
or Near-Eastern laws, we have an increasing sense that the
predominance of Roman Law in the legal studies cannot be other
than the product of the outworn heritage of a German paradigm
which was already out of date at the beginning of this century. The
"survival" of Roman studies, and their "renewal" can thus be
explained only on an ideological basis; that is, as a false consciousness
of reality at the service of governance projects. This conclusion is
reinforced by further consideration of the theory of State and the
settling of disputes discussed in the next sections.
C. The "Origin of the State"
In the previous sections we discussed a central problem for
private law, namely the development of contract law. Now we handle
a second major example related to public law, namely the
development of a coherent conception of the State from a legal point
of view.
The first issue to confront is when, if ever, did Roman Law
develop a conception of the State? One of the major characteristics
of Roman Law to the modern observer is, indeed, a total lack of
public law. The point here is so clear and uncontroversial that we can
see it admitted even in traditional literature: "[t]he Roman Law did
not provide a clear and functional definition of the state." 285
A major point in a theory of the State is its independence from
the particular person or the particular family of the actual ruler: the
very fact that the State exists in itself as an independent corporation.
280. See id at 1724-29.
281. Id. at 1731.
282. On the financial organization of medieval business, see ROBINSON ET AL., supra
note 67, at 100-05.
283. See Westbrook, supra note 231, at 28.
284. See id. at 22; see also YOCHANAN MUFFS, STUDIES IN ARAMAIC LEGAL PAPYRI
FROM ELEPHANTINE (1969).
285. Mayali, supra note 28, at 1469.
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Such an existence can be assured only by assuming rules for
governance, and legitimization of authority.286 In relation to Roman
history, we have to draw a clear distinction between the Principate
and the Dominate which emerged after the Great Crisis of the third
century C.E.
The Principate began as an extraordinary magistracy, and it
never entirely lost this character. Consequently at no time was there
any acknowledged legal system of succession. Given the troubled
history of succession, even normally biased Romanists had to
recognize this central failure of the Roman constitution. It is
indeed common knowledge that the troops, especially the imperial
guard, played a considerable part in the matter, and on more than one
occasion armies from different parts of the Empire, each willing to
raise its leader to the throne, had fought the question out by force of
arms. Sometimes the Senate was able to exercise a real choice. The
number and strength of the factions, and especially of the "armed
men" might make all the difference to their carrying their nominee to
power, and it made no difference to the legal quality of their act. If
there were several nominees, each was legitimate until it was
overthrown by another.
The point is that no rule was established and that no theory has
been developed to cope with this central problem. Here, the "non-
capacity" displayed by Roman lawyers to develop a doctrine if not a
practice is peculiarly shocking. Even the greatest master of Roman
constitutional history had to say that there never was a system of
government which had lost so completely the conception of
legitimacy as the Augustan principate,288 and described it as autocracy
tempered by legally permanent revolution389
The Great Crisis which occurred during the third century C.E.,
from the assassination of Alexander Severus (235 C.E.) to the
accession of Diocletian (284 C.E.) was a time of confusion and
disaster. But the internal order was re-established and thereafter the
Empire was ruled for the most part by a number of comparatively
stable dynasties. The model of constitution we can find in the fourth
century is indeed totally different the previous original Roman
constitution. We can now easily distinguish a first empire, emerging
from the Republic and lasting until the third century C.E., and a
second empire build up in the fourth century on the ground of quite
286. See ROBERT NOzICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 113 (1974) (describing as
"crucial" the state's monopoly over the use of force in a territory).
287. See JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 353-55.
288. See 2 THEODOR MOMMSEN, ROMISCHES STAATSRECHT [ROMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 844 (1887).
289. See id at 842.
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different governing principles. The striking difference from the past
and the foreign origin of these principles are acknowledged even in
traditional literature:
The methods adopted to achieve stability were, in the main, three-
the transformation of the imperial power into a monarchy on an
Oriental model, the territorial division among co-regents and the
reorganization of the administrative machine.29
In the new model, imperial dignity became a sacred matter: the
emperor was no longer theoretically a first among equals but a
remote and sacred figure, enveloped in ceremony.291 A real cult of
the emperor as god was established, 292 and then transformed after the
Constantine reform and adoption of Christianity in 312 C.E. into a
doctrine of the emperor as god's agent. Diocletian's administrative
reorganization put all the Empire on the same footing. There was no
longer a specific Roman Law distinct from what was available in the
provinces. Constantine finally separated civil from military office.
The Emperor and his officials now headed the whole civil
administration, with all the jurisdictional powers. A minister of
justice was appointed and a permanent bureaucracy was provided for
the government. Besides, as we have already seen, finally the state
backed private parties in the settling of disputes.
Here we have a clear conception of an imperial state, with a
sacred monarchy and a strong bureaucracy, both equally lacking
under the traditional Roman constitution. Such a sacred monarchy
separated military and civil administration, and took over
bureaucratic control of society.
Whatever one may think of autocracies, it is clear that, from the
point of view not of a modern critical attitude, but from the
standpoint of a traditional evolutionary paradigm, the creation of a
central state was an achievement. It is also quite clear that the
Roman constitution was transformed from chaos to an ordered set of
principles and practices by means of cultural borrowings from
"Oriental" models. The point is, where did these models come from?
In the provinces of the Eastern part of the Empire, which
became dominant after the third century crisis,2 93 that form of
governance which is normally called "Hellenistic" survived.2 94 Such
form of power organization, as we saw, derived from the conquest
290. JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAs, supra note 126, at 421 (emphasis added).
291. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 17.
292. For a description of the evolution of the cult, and its earlier appearances, see
generally LILY Ross TAYLOR, THE DIViNrrY OFTHE ROMAN EMPEROR (1931).
293. Recall that the capital was displaced by Diocletian to Spalatum, in Croatia, and to
Byzantium (Istanbul, Turkey) by Constantine. See WILLIAMS, supra note 211, at 148 &
205.
294. G.W. BOWERSOCK, HELLENISM IN LATE ANTiQurrY (1990).
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performed by Alexander the Great of the Persian and Egyptian
empires in 332 B.C.E.. So what we have to do now is to investigate
(1) the eventual Egyptian or Asian forms in Hellenism, and (2) their
possible later embodiments in a Roman renewed system of
governance after the Great crisis. Let us start with the first issue.
Scholars have been divided on the point of the "originality" of
the power organization in the Hellenistic states, and once again we
can contrast two models. The first model points openly at the
African-Asian origin of the Hellenistic monarchy: Hellenistic kings
were the heirs of the Egyptian Monarchy.295 On the other hand we
found theories denying totally this origin, and pointing to an
autonomous Greek creation: Hellenistic Monarchy was a pure Greek
military government which assumed religious forms only to better
control local populations, using also the already existing bureaucratic
organization, especially in Egypt.296
We can contrast this approach even with a conventional point of
view, which I assume here in order to strengthen my theory. As far as
lawyers are interested in forms,297 especially in the conventional
approach, it is important to note that even the supporters of the
autonomous Greek creation concede that Hellenistic Kingdoms
assumed the forms of Egyptian and Persian monarchies. They add
that these clever Greek kings decided to use the already-existing
bureaucracy, especially in Egypt. Now I maintain that from a
standard point of view the form of the power and the organization of
administration are the essence of a power structure. Thus we have to
address two points: (a) the character of the Ruler as a sacred person
and as an owner (deus et dominus) and (b) the unfolding of a central
bureaucracy. In the following discussion I would show simply that:
The Egyptian state shared these traits
These traits were in Hellenism
After the third century crisis the Roman empire emerged sharing
these traits. We can understand this story by viewing it through the
political multiculturalism prevailing in the African-Asiatic side of
Mediterranean civilizations, which imported into the so-called
Western world patterns of non-Western origin. Moreover, it is
apparent that the birth of a doctrine of the State, undeveloped in
Roman approaches, must be seen as a major achievement from a
295. See PIERRE LtVtQUE, LE MONDE HELLtNISTIQUE 54 (1969); see also C.W.
MCEWAN, THE ORIENTAL ORIGIN OF HELLENISTIC KINGSHIP (1934).
296. See ANDRP AYMARD & JEANNINE AUBOYER, L'ORIENT ET LA GRtCE
ANTIQUE 396 (6th ed. 1967).
297. See P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-
AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY
AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 7 (1987).
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traditional evolutionary viewpoint.298
Given these remarks, we can recall that the common feature of
governance in Hellenism was based on King-Worship, the
organization of a central court as a set of officials strongly linked to
the monarch, as it was before in Asia and Egypt.299 The King-
Worship was first borrowed by Alexander himself, who assumed the
titles of the Pharaohs and the Persian emperors, and was proclaimed
son of the major Egyptian god (Ammon). At the head of the King-
Worship stood Alexander, whose priesthood was held by the greatest
in the land. Nothing similar had ever existed in ancient Greece,
whereas the sacred character of Egyptian monarchy is well known
and has been the subject of much study 30 What is unbelievable is the
bias used to describe the Egyptian system as "[e]ven more alien to us
in the West than the Mesopotamian... a dictatorship of a god-
king,"0 1 as if that system did not become the basis of Hellenistic
Kingdoms, ° and, as we shall see, was transplanted even into the
Roman empire. There is in such accounts an ideology of the West
which is not rooted in history, nor in practices, but just in fantasy.
What was the symbol of power in Hellenism? The Macedonian
Dynasty came to be considered as the legal successor of the native
dynasties of the Pharaohs, borrowing from the older practices the
diadem, scepter and signet ring as power-symbols. 3 °3 According to
this conception in the Ptolemaic Monarchy, an official cult of the
living rulers was established, the image of the king started to adorn
the coinage, his acts were dated after the years of his reign, sacrifices
were offered for his health and welfare, his birthday became a state-
holiday, and his death an occasion for universal mourning3"'-all
things to which we remain astonishingly accustomed. This was of
course a hereditary monarchy and the order of succession was
controlled by a system resembling that for private estates.
All these features were later borrowed by the Romans. As we
saw, with the conquest of Alexandria on August 1, 30 B.C.E., the
29& See JOHN L. COMAROFF & SIMON ROBERTS, RULES AND PROCESSES: THE
CULTURAL LOGIC OF DISPUTE IN AN AFRICAN CONTEXT 5 (1981) (describing the
evolutionary model). But see DAVID COHEN, LAW, VIOLENCE AND COMMUNITY IN
CLASSICAL ATHENS 5 (1995) (critiquing the evolutionary model).
299. See MCEWAN, supra note 295, at 47-49.
300. See, e.g., R. A. SCHWALLER DE LUBICZ, LE ROI DE LA THI#OCRATIE
PHARAONIQUE [THE PHARAOH AS A THEOCRATIC KING](1961).
301. D. BRENDAN NAGLE, THE ANCIENT WORLD: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
HISTORY 24 (3d ed. 1996).
302. See TAYLOR, supra note 292, at 247 (tracing the idea of the "god-king" from Persia
rather than Egypt).
303. See TAUBENSCHLAG, supra note 262, at 562.
304. See iU at 562-63.
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Ptolemaic kingdom fell to the victorious Augustus, who took over the
country as a successor of the previous Monarchy, so that upon the
new Roman ruler the same honors were bestowed as upon his
Egyptian and Greek predecessors.3 05 Within the Roman system of
government, the land was entrusted to a prefect who acted as a local
delegate of the Emperor.306 The prefect became a replica of the
Ptolemaic king as the head of the entire civil and military
administration of the country. When, after the Great Crisis,
Diocletian restored to the empire the conception of "Owner and
God" of the Empire ("Dominus and deus," from which comes the
period appellation "Dominate"), though this conception was foreign
to the Western part of the empire it was no novelty in Egypt, where
they had always attributed to their kings such power. We have a
signal of the integration of Egyptian conceptions within the Roman
form of government in a leveling of the differences between Egypt as
a province and the rest of the Empire. Indeed, when Diocletian
assumed the new pattern of governance he deprived Egyptian cities
of their special privileges.
To summarize, the conception of the emperor's divinity
developed at a time when Rome was in close contact with the ideas of
the Eastern world, and in particular with political ideas preserved in
the kingdoms of Egypt and the Middle East.307 It is important to
recall that this concept of the ruler as sacred persisted after the
Christianization of the Empire, even if it was reshaped in Christian
terms.3 08
We must stress the fact that Egyptian principles and forms of
government were strikingly opposite to Macedonian original
tradition. Macedonian tradition was based on a military assembly,
acting as the representative of the people's sovereignty, which played
its part in deciding matters pertaining to succession.30 9 Though at the
very beginning the role of this assembly was not completely
theoretical, in time its significance sank to that of a mere formality.310
We easily can perceive how Egyptian and Macedonian monarchies
were grounded upon opposite principles, whereas there is a strong
analogy between Macedonian and Roman institutions; both in
Hellenism and in the late Empire, the assembly of the army electing
its commander was superseded by a hereditary monarchy. It is part of
305. See id at 567-69.
306. See NAPHTALI LEWIs, LIFE IN EGYPT UNDER ROMAN RULE 9 (1983).
307. See TAYLOR, supra note 292, at 1.
308. Christian emperors claimed to be the supreme spiritual leaders of Christendom.
See BERMAN, supra note 4, at 88-89.
309. See TAUBENSCHLAG, supra note 262, at 564.
310. See id
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the normal "Indo-European" bias to praise the first form as a kind of
assembly of free men against the slavish institutions of Eastern
monarchy. But it is like praising a kind of "Pinochet theory" of
freedom preserved through recurrent military coups, giving the army
a pivotal role in constitutional choices. Besides, as I already have
suggested, this traditional praise of Macedonian and Roman military
assemblies clashes with equally traditional evolutionary accounts.
Certainly from the viewpoint of an economic theory of the State,31'
the Egyptian form was more effective than the Roman or
Macedonian; it proved indeed to be quite effective in the Eastern
Roman Empire, which adopted it and was able to last for 1,000 years
more. Not a bad record in the history of empires.
The second major point we are to cope with is the unfolding of
bureaucracy.312 Ancient Egypt has been defined as a Provider state
centered on a bureaucratic organization of societal governance.3 13
The material acquisition of Egypt-conspicuous wealth, palaces,
temples, and conquest-all depended on a particular skill in the
administration of resources.314  Whatever one may think of
bureaucracies, it is quite evident that in an evolutionary biased
pattern they represent an improvement:315 bureaucracies, in this
context, may mean efficiency 316 and also the capacity for public
enforcement of rules, in striking contrast, for instance, with the
largely private Greek system of enforcement.3 17
Bureaucracy in ancient Egypt was confined to a powerful clergy,
which is normally contrasted with Romans' commitment to lay
lawyers to govern society318 with the standard pro-Western bias. But
the caste of Egyptian bureaucrats was not indeed too priestly. The
so-called "priests" who performed these tasks of government were
laymen319 who spent part of the year in the service of the "temple"
and the remainder in their normal secular occupations. The "temple"
311. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 228, at 143-45.
312. See generally T.F. CARNEY, BUREAUCRACY IN TRADITIONAL SOCIETY
ROMANO-BYZANTINE BUREAUCRACIES VIEWED FROM WrrI1N (1971).
313. See KEMP, supra note 220, at 109-11.
314. See i Lat ll.
315. It's enough to recall Weber's well-known theory stressing the importance for
"development" of formal rationality, bureaucracies, and the shaping of law by trained
legal specialists. See MAX RHEINSTEN ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 304 (Max
Rheinstein ed., 1966).
316. Remember that when Augustus took over the "centralized" Egypt, it was the
richest grain lands of the time. See SHERMAN LEROY WALLACE, TAXATION IN EGYPT
FROM AUGUSTUS TO DIOCLETIAN 1 (Princeton Univ. Press 1938).
317. See DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 53-67 (1978).
318. See infra pp. 543-45.
319. D. BRENDAN NAGLE, THE ANCIENT WORLD: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
HISTORY 28 (3d ed. 1996).
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is here to be understood more as a public building than as a house of
prayer. The priests played no ethical role. Rather, their principal
function was assisting the pharaoh in his most important function: the
maintenance of the divine order of creation (ma'at in Egyptian
terms). It was a technical role requiring ritual cleanliness, not inner
purity. This personnel formed an administrative structure and a
particular regime which remained quite unchanged 320 during
Hellenism and the Roman rule. The take-over of Egypt involved but
slight change in administration,321 and the same system was for all
practical purposes continued into the Roman period without any
significant change. As a matter of fact, it was Rome that in the
moment of crisis had to use the survival of these models to renew the
agonizing Empire.322
Thus if we finally look at these findings we can see how much the
late empire was built thanks to the patterns preserved in Egypt and
the Near East, and by abandoning the previous Roman organization.
This movement is the more apparent if we then consider the hard
core of the Roman legal process: the mechanics of dispute resolution.
D. The Mechanics of the Law
Having seen the defects and primitivism of Roman contract law,
and having seen how a coherent conception of the State was foreign
to the Roman legal mind until after the third century crisis, when it
assumed a clear alien form, we can raise now the fundamental
question: Has Roman Law existed at all ?323 I presume that we
cannot say of a system of rules or principles that it is a legal system, if
it is not able to enforce the entitlements it assigns, or the rules of
which it is composed. So we can legitimately wonder: did the
mechanics of Roman Law allow people to get justice? I insist that
this question does not depend on any actual or universal definition of
justice or law. It is simply a matter of knowing whether Roman Law
was in fact enforcing its own rules. Was the machinery of Roman
320. Sometimes this stability is presented with the typical bias of indicating that Egypt
was a system without evolution, or development, just marked by repetition as a main (and
negative) cultural feature. See id. at 24.
321. See WALLACE, supra note 316, at 1, 7.
322. See Jacques Pirenne, L'apport Juridique de l'Egypt d la Civilisation [Egyptian
Legacy to Legal Culture], in 1 STUDI IN ONORE DI EDOARDO VOLTERRA 153, 163
(Milano, Dott. A. Giuffr6 ed., 1971).
323. See Paul Veyne, L'Empire Romain [The Roman Empire], in 1 HISTOIRE DE LA
VIE PRIVPE 164-171 (Philippe Aries & George Duby eds., Paris, Editions du Seuil 1985).
This work received two different English versions in I HIsTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE: FROM
PAGAN ROME TO BYZANTIUM (Philippe Aris, G. Duby, Paul Veyne eds., Belknap Press
1987) and PAUL VEYNE, THE ROMAN EMPIRE (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Belknap
Press 1985).
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justice designed to make rules enforced?
That is an obvious fundamental question, but to cope with it
adequately we must contrast the different accounts made by
Romanists and by historians who don't share the bias of the formers
toward their professional subject matter. Thus I propose to the
reader first the standard lawyers' account of the Roman legal process,
and second an account taken from well known historians. From the
contrast between the two accounts it will emerge how much the
Romanists' version of the story is biased in favor of a presupposed
Roman skill for legal matters, totally refuted in the historians'
account. This bias can be explained once again only in ideological
terms, and once that it is "revealed" it must be abandoned in favor of
alternative views.
In the lawyer's account,324 someone who (until some time after
200 B.C.E.) wished to make a claim, the pursuer (or plaintiff), had to
summon the defender simply by an oral request. It was up to the
pursuer to persuade or force a reluctant defender. The parties had to
appear together before the Praetor to start the first stage of the trial.
The pursuer had to speak the appropriate form of his claim in set
words. After* the question at issue was set (liis contestatio), the
Praetor appointed an arbiter (judex) to whom the case was sent. The
arbiter had to investigate the facts and to give his judgement. If it was
in favor of the pursuer, it was always in a definite sum of money.
Execution required the authorization of a magistrate, but had to be
put into effect by the pursuer.
Now let's examine the historian's account of the same story.
325
Let's presume to have as property our grandfather's small farm. A
wealthy neighbor likes this property, and enters it with his slaves,
driving ours off and beating them to death. How would the law
handle this situation (until some time after 200 B.C.E.)? According
to Roman Law our neighbor committed a tort-a private wrong. It is
then up to us to file a complaint in court, and to make the defendant
show up in the courtroom. So we must take him among his slaves,
bring him away, and jail him in the basement up to the day in court.
If we do not succeed the trial cannot start. We can succeed only by
becoming a client of some rich Patrician. If we submit to him, he will
become our Patron, and will send his slaves to capture the neighbor,
so the trial can start. The magistrate will not solve the case, he will
encharge a private person as an arbiter. Let's presume that this
arbiter gives judgment for the restoration of our property. According
to Roman Law of the time, the court could not issue an order of
restitution. The court could only condemn the defendant to pay
324. See ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 80-84.
325. See Veyne, supra note 323, at 164-71.
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damages. Then we should have to seize (physically, and so by way of
our Patron) the defendant's goods, sell them to the public, take for
ourselves the value of the small farm, and give the excess to the
neighbor.
Would one really desire such convoluted and difficult justice? If
Voltaire said he was glad that the Promised land, a rocky desert and a
sick river, has not been promised to him, I would say that I am glad
that my rights are not assisted by Roman justice. It is a justice
designed for powerful clan bosses. Indeed it can hardly be
denominated a legal system, since it's a mechanism of legal
enforcement. It is quite clear that the enforcement of the law actually
depended merely on the social strength of the parties.326 It was a way
of pursuing vengeance with the slight intervention of a magistrate to
make sure that certain magic forms had been properly respected. No
technical discourse, or biased narrative, can at the very end deny this
elementary truth. And indeed modern Romanists sometimes admit
it327 even if with some pruderie: "[A] pursuer who was socially or
economically inferior to the defender must have had difficulties. '328
There is another related point I would stress. Normally Roman
Law is presented without any emphasis on exoticism and magic,
whereas this emphasis is placed on accounts of Asian or African
customs. This strategy is clearly directed toward a narrative of
Roman Law as the root of our modern ideas, and toward a
marginalization or exclusion of other ancient laws from serious
consideration. 329 I would briefly recall the obvious, namely that as we
have already seen for contracts, Roman Law, far from being
"rational" in the modem sense, was also in the practical procedural
field, full of magic and exotic. Recall that the plaintiff had to speak
the appropriate form of his claim in set words. It is Gaius himself
who tells us that a man who wished to sue for the destruction of his
vines lost his case because he used the word "vines" rather than the
word "trees," according to the Law of XII Tables (XII T 8.11).330 It
could be quite easy to produce examples by the sackful. I would be
clear on the point that I am not blaming Roman Law for having done
so in second century B.C.E.; I am simply pointing out the fact that it is
odd indeed to praise Roman Law as a unique forerunner of modem
justice, since, fortunately, things moved exactly in the other direction:
326. See PETER GARNSEY, SOCIAL STATUS AND LEGAL PRIVILEGE 189 (1970).
327. See J.M. KELLY, ROMAN LITIGATION 6-12 (1966) with reference as to later times.
328. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 80, where about the Roman procedure of summons
we find "[s]ometimes clearly a defender will have simply ignored the pursuer."
329. On exoticization as a strategy of Comparative Law, see Kennedy, supra note 5, at
Part IV.D.1.
330. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 81 (citing G. INST. 4.11).
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the law evolved not on this ground but against these ideas. But what
then? Did Roman Law evolve from this primitive stage of magic
organization of private vengeance?
After the second century B.C.E., the mechanics we have
described evolved toward the so-called "Formulary system,"
dominant from roughly 150 B.C.E. to the end of the second century
C.E.331 Now the pursuer had to frame his claim in a draft writ (a
formula) to request that the Praetor grant him relief. In any case, it
was still the pursuer's problem to get the defender to court. Once
there, the defender might accept the formula proposed, or might
argue for its modification. Only when the parties agreed on a writ as
a basis for the lawsuit would the Praetor appoint the arbiter and issue
the decree empowering the trial. In principle, condemnation was
always in money terms, and execution was still an affair for the
successful pursuer to put into effect.332 As we may easily see, the
"new" system was clearly an evolution of the former, but it turned out
to be even worse for the pursuer. Having to frame his claim in one of
the admitted writs, and having to reach an agreement with the other
party on the proposed formula, he needed still more the aid of a
powerful Patron to manage the process. So the defects of Roman
Law we are examining were not confined to an early stage, but lasted
through the centuries as long as the dominant pattern remained
purely of Roman origin.
It was only after the Great Crisis of the third century that the
machinery of justice changed dramatically toward totally new forms
finally based on the active intervention of the State. The new form is
known as cognitio and it was no longer left to the Praetor and the
private arbiter, but it was administered by an imperial official who
was in charge of the whole process. The pursuer now had to hand in
court a written pleading, and the summons was issued with the
backing of the court. Regular courts were organized and the
witnesses wanted by the parties were summoned by the court under
penalty and interrogated by the judge.333 Execution could also be
backed with official power. And, the judgement was no longer
necessarily limited to money damages. The judge could order the
restoration of property, or specific performance.
As we may see, the new system was conceived under a totally
different set of ideas. Where did these ideas come from? It is well
established that cognitio was the kind of jurisdiction normally
exercised in the provinces, and an influence from Hellenistic practice
331. AdL at 85.
332. See icL at 88.
333. See id. at 90-96.
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is considered probable.334 Moreover any distinction between the
proper Roman Law (jus civile) and the "foreign law" disappeared.3 35
It is quite evident that a great modernization of the law occurred, and
that the new legal process of the Late Empire marks a major break
with the previous mechanics of the law.
Only after the Great Crisis did Roman Law become effective,
independently of social or political power of the parties. That is to
say that only when Roman Law lost its original character in favor of
the more "Oriental" traits of the Late Empire, did it become fit for
the "Western" ideology of law. Notwithstanding these obvious
points, the traditional professional Romanists' bias for superiority of
what is Roman led authors to speak of the new effective system as a
"distortion" of the original process. 336 I would rather say that if we
finally abandon this bias we can see how much our view of the law,
and especially of legal enforcement of established rights, must pay
more credit to the Eastern part of the Mediterranean basin than to
Rome, where these practices had been quite unknown. I think that
the strength of the ideology we are exposed to in the law schools can
be measured by how hard we find it to acknowledge that Roman Law
was in practice ineffective as a legal system, and that the idea of legal
enforcement of rights came on only when original Roman Law was
"distorted" by provincial practices.
E. A Theory of the Rising Jurists
Now we reach the distinctive feature of Roman and Western law:
the development of a legal science and a lay profession, represented
in Rome by the "jurists" as a leading characteristic of this tradition, as
contrasted with all other ancient and exotic laws.337 By this I mean
the very existence of an independent class of lay lawyers as a central
gear of societal governance and legal evolution.
From this point of view, Western law would clearly be the
recipient of a Roman achievement, being based on such elites of
independent professionals.
Moreover the theory of Roman jurists serves to deny the
importance of borrowings: even if they occurred they become
relatively unimportant because the eventually borrowed institutions
would have been transformed by the jurists into truly legal
334. See id at 95-96.
335. This was a consequence of the Antoninian Constitution which in 212 C.E. extended
Roman citizenship to practically all free inhabitants of the Empire. See ROBINSON ET AL.,
supra note 67, at 3.
336. JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 398.
337. SCHULZ, supra note 22, at iv ("Roman legal science is the purest and most original
expression of the Roman genius.").
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institutions, and it was the jurists alone who really elaborated
sophisticated doctrines and theories. Thus the existence of Roman
jurists, and their cultural role in the making of law, becomes essential
in defending the alleged supremacy of Rome in this field of societal
governance.
We have thus to investigate who these jurists were, and why and
how they came on. First of all, according to the conventional account,
the jurists specialized not so much in acting on other's behalf in
courts, as did orators, like the well known Cicero, 338 but in giving
advice on legal matters. They discussed, and more importantly, they
wrote about legal problems. In such a way there emerged a class of
learned authors who left us a scholarly literature about law:
something which can prima facie legitimately be seen as a unique trait
of Roman legal culture. It is the literature which emerged from the
jurists, and which became the Late Empire Law Codes, and finally
into the Justinian's compilation,3 39 especially in the Digest.34° Since
the Digest became from the twelfth century on the basic textbook in
European universities,341 it is this literature which became the
common ground of the Western legal evolution. Generations of
lawyers have been instructed on the basis of Roman literature, and
the schemes and categories used by Roman Lawyers became the
form, and sometimes the substance, of the modern Codes of
continental Europe. It is hard to overstate the importance of their
scholarly work, if we recall that, for example, even Langdell, starting
the American university legal education, was surveying the common
law doctrines with reference to Roman jurists' theories. 342
The bulk of Roman greatness is the science of the law. It is also
the major mark of its distinction. But here I want to show that the
emergence of jurists in ancient Rome was due to essential defects of
the Roman legal process, that we cannot any longer disregard the
possibility of an independent academic legal tradition outside Rome,
and that probably the major achievements in Roman legal
338. See generally BRUCE W. FRIER, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS 185-86 (1985).
339. The Justinian's Compilation, finally brought into force in 554 C.E., is fourfold: the
Institutes issued as an elementary textbook for law students, the Digest being the
compilation of the authoritative juristic writings, the Code as a collection of imperial
legislation, and the Novels embodying Justinian's own statutes.
340. On the instructions of Justinian, the compilers edited both the juristic extracts and
the imperial legislation; thus the law preserved in the Compilation is neither the authentic
law of the classical period, nor a simple statement of the law of Justinian's own day, but a
layered amalgam, reflecting the strategies of redaction. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note
67, at 3.
341. See id. at 42.
342. See generally 2 C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACrs 987 (2d ed., 1879).
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development were reached by non-Roman Lawyers in the context of
a de-Romanization of the law of the Empire. So, once again, I have
to jeopardize the entire package of received ideas challenging both
Roman, and so Western, pretensions of uniqueness and supremacy in
law.
A first point to be stressed is the social origin of the jurists. A
striking difference of Roman society is that the jurists did not belong
to a middle class milieu, as normally lawyers do in modern societies.
Even if they are quite wealthy they are not born princes, or tycoons.
Roman jurists on the contrary were men of the upper classes,343 they
came from Roman nobility.344 The jurists about whom we hear in the
ensuing Republican period (from the mid-third century B.C.E.) 45
were nearly all members of the Senate-the 300 leading men of the
state. These were rich and powerful men of prestige, many of whom
had been consuls. Why did such wealthy and influential men become
jurists? And why did the Roman legal process need jurists?
I think that the reason for their emergence within the upper class
springs from two major institutional defects of Roman Law which we
have already partially examined. The first is the lack of regular courts
and professional judges. The second is that until the post-classical
period Rome had no law schools.346
The Roman system was so primitive and defective that a room
for jurists was allowed confining the administration of the law to
powerful private citizens. As we have seen the Roman process was
split into two parts: the first, behind the magistrate, and the second,
the real trial, entrusted to a non-professional arbiter. The lack of
professional judges required the jurists to advise not only the parties
but even the lay judges who decided cases. Since even the magistrate
was not a professional, but a politician in career, he too needed the
advice of someone learned in the law. The jurists came together as a
hidden informal profession of experts advising all the people involved
in the litigation process, precisely because no system of courts was
established.
This explains why there were jurists. But I would add an
explanation of why they belonged to the upper class. If we recall the
mechanics of Roman Law we must remember that there was no
public enforcement of summons and executions. Why should learned
and powerful men waste time on developing a sophisticated legal
scholarship in a context where all depended on the respective social
strength of the parties at stake? The fact is that in practice a man had
343. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 1.
344. See SCHULZ, supra note 22, at 42.
345. See ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 43.
346. See id.
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to become the client of one of these powerful men to succeed even in
summoning the defendant. Behind the legal process there was the
Patronage,347 and it is Patronage which really explains the features of
Roman Law.348 Patronage is a social system dividing the inhabitants
into patrons and clients, the former protecting the latter in their social
activity. This was quite a widespread model of societal organization
in the Mediterranean region: normally in a system dominated by
patronage there is no need for written laws to enact justice, and
instead of judges in the modem sense of the word, the patrons employ
a system of middlemen-arbiters-who on their behalf can distribute
justice among the various groups.349 This picture matches exactly
with an unbiased description of the Roman legal mechanics. And we
must note that the pro-Roman bias is so strong that sometimes it is
maintained that the patronage system itself is of Roman invention!350
The fact is that because of the lack of legal enforcement of rights, we
have seen in the previous section, the Roman system remained based
on patronage, and perfected its mechanisms, whereas it was
superseded by different schemes in other countries.
If we adopt the Patronage model to explain Roman legal history
we can see that members of the upper class had a personal interest in
litigations: they were the law. They could assure summons and
executions. They were the living oracles of the law in the proper
sense in which they were powerful clan bosses privately charged with
enforcing rules. Thus, I think that we can explain jurists on the basis
of the mechanics of law and its defective character in the settling of
disputes.
From this point of view we can also investigate which kind of
literature was that of the jurists. Every piece of writing is a kind of
something, and indeed since the jurists came from the most respected
Roman families, this imparted to their science a distinctive
atmosphere which was not "dissipated" till the end of the classical
period.351  Republican jurisprudence was as pronounced an
aristocratic literature as the republican administration was an
aristocratic system. Jurisprudence was a national science, because it
was controlled by the same men as was the political administration,
347. See PATRONS AND CLIENTS IN MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETIES (Ernest Gellner &
John Waterbury eds., Duckworth 1977); SAMUEL N. EISENSTADT & LuIS ROMIGER,
PATRONS, CLIENTS AND FRIENDS: INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS AND THE STRUCrTURE
OF TRUST IN SOCIETY (1984).
348. Remember that in some Civil Law countries even today, a counselor is called a
patron of his client.
349. See Niels Peter Lemche, Justice in Western Asia in Antiquity, or: Why No Laws
Were Needed!, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1695 (1995).
350. See RONALD SYME, THE ROMAN REvOLuTION 369-86 (1939).
351. SCHULZ, supra note 22, at 23. I think that the reader can appreciate the bias.
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among them was no place for non-Romans. The jurists sprang out of
the members of the priestly colleges charged with the development of
the sacral law.352 At the beginning they were pointiffs. A movement
toward secularization of law leading to distinguish private from sacral
law began as early as the third century B.C.E., even if in the second
century the pointiffs continued to be prominent consultants in private
law. A single family, the gens Mucia, exercised a kind of de facto
monopoly on the profession, and at least three well known jurists of
the time belonged to this family: P. Mucius Scaevola, P. Licinius
Crassus Mucianus, and Q. Mucius Scaevola, with whom we reach at
once the climax and the end of pontifical legal science. It is supposed
that it was the Hellenistic tendency to specialization which led to the
abandonment of private law by the pointiffs, and to the rise of a
purely lay legal literature. Indeed in no period known to us was
Roman legal science entirely exempt from Greek influence. In the
last two centuries of the Republic it became pervaded by the
intellectual movement of multicultural Hellenism. 353 So even the
birth of Roman legal literature was derived from a contact with the
East. The point is well established in the most pervasive book written
on the argument "Roman legal science contained in itself great
potentialities ... but... there was needed the solvent energy of
Greek forms. The immensely important result was nothing less than
that Roman legal science developed into a professional science of the
Hellenistic type, within the framework of Hellenistic science. 354
We can appreciate both the acknowledgment of the "contact"
and its etherization through reference to the Greek (Indo-European)
forms, and the conventional biased confusion between Hellenism and
Greek culture.355 The contact is admitted but it is referred to as
Greeks. Indeed, the Greeks never developed an autonomous science
of the law, and a peculiar legal profession,356 and it is quite out of step
to assume that a contact with them produced the outspring of the
Roman legal science. It was the contact with "Hellenism" which
produced a change,357 and certainly it was a peculiar Roman change,
but I think that Rome has not been alone in developing a "legal
science." We have to compare these findings with accounts of the
other ancient Mediterranean laws. It is conventionally admitted that
in the other countries legislation was not lacking but it was lacking
352. See id. at 40-41.
353. See id. at 38. See also PETER STEIN, REGULAE JURIS: FROM JURISTIC RULES TO
LEGAL MAXIMS 54 (1966).
354. Id. at 38-39.
355. See AvI-YORAN, supra note 239 and accompanying text.
356. See GEORGE M. CALHOUN, INTRODUCTION TO GREEK LEGAL SCIENCE (1944).
357. STEIN, supra note 353, at 23.
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science. It is conventionally denied that there was something which
might be known as an Egyptian or Semitic legal science. Thus the
genius and skillfulness for legal studies remain conventionally
confined to Indo-Europeans.
This traditional denial must now be reexamined in light of new
theories of the Near Eastern Law Codes as academic works.
According to this theory such codes are not to be intended as pieces
of legislation but as scientific literature, which is merely presenting
the law.358 They represent a legal library for judges, a reference work
for the courts.359 They were didactic texts that only later became law-
texts.3 ° As such the ancient codes, for instance the Mesopotamian
law codes, are to be seen as part of a learned tradition.361 In such a
framework the premise upon which this theory is based is that the law
of ancient Israel was an integral part of a much wider legal tradition.
The tradition in question covered the area of the Ancient Near East
where cuneiform writing and learning prevailed, but its influence was
felt even beyond these bounds. It is not only a question of similar
legal forms362 employed in the practice, but of similarity of legal
institutions and intellectual activity surrounding the law, displaying a
connection definitely not coincidental, and far beyond inevitable
similarity in the problems facing societies. The seven codes known to
us from cuneiform sources363 and the legal corpus of the covenant
code (Ex 21,2-22,6) and of Deuteronomy (Dt. 21,1-25,11)364 are all
immediately recognizable as belonging to a single literary genre.
Recent research has shown that these codes are in origin at least
scientific treatises on the law.365 They derive from the realm of
Mesopotamian science, a form presumably invented by Sumerians
and carried via the Babylonians to every corner of the Near East
358. See Westbrook, supra note 231, at 15-36.
359. See Raymond Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law Codes, 92 REVUE
BIBLIQUE 247,255 (1985).
360. See Bernard S. Jackson, From Dharma to Law, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 490 (1975).
361. See Lemche, supra note 349, at 1696.
362. See J. MUFFS, STUDIES IN THE ARAMAIC LEGAL PAPYRI FROM ELEPHANTINE
(Leiden, SDIOAP, 1969).
363. Codes Ur-Nammu (CU) (c. 2100 B.C.E.), Codex Lipit-Ishtar (CL) (c. 1930
B.C.E.), Codex Eshunna (C.E.) (c. 1770 B.C.E.), Codex Hammurabi (CH) (c. 1750
B.C.E.), Assyrian Laws (AL), Hittite Laws (HL), Neo-Babylonian Laws (NBL). See
MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR (1995).
See MARTHA T. ROSS, LAW COLLECIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR
(1995).
364. This theory is challenged by Bernard S. Jackson, Modeling Biblical Law: The
Covenant Code, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1745 (1995), but he also recognizes the existence of
a "wisdom" dimension of law in the Middle East, which is our point here.
365. See RAYMOND WESTBROOK, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL AND CUNEIFORM LAW 2
(1988).
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where cuneiform writing penetrated.
What is the more relevant to us is the theory that scribal schools
were established to teach the language and its cuneiform script to
local scribes as far afield as Egypt and Anatolia.366 Such scribal
schools367 were little more than mere cram schools on the art of
writing; they may truly be described as the universities of the Ancient
Near East,368 where law was also studied and taught.
According to Westerbook,369 the teaching method was as follows.
The starting point was a decision in a case, with preference to
borderline cases. Facts and decision were recast in a hypothesis: If J
does a, then the legal effect is b, and the issue was then examined by
the technique of variation, changing the details of circumstances, and
with a further set of variations imposed on the facts within the
discussion. This way of teaching law is astonishingly similar to what
we call the "Socratic" method with reference to the Greeks.3 70
Everything is especially familiar if compared with the exotic of the
noble Romans writing on law on their behalf as clan big bosses,
namely as private enforcers of the law in a patronage societal system.
In addition, the great emphasis on Roman jurisprudence hides the
fact that in Rome there were no law schools, and nothing similar to
the scribal schools, until the late empire, when they were established,
of course, in the East.371
Thus the basic building blocks of the ancient codes have been
derived from school problems, and in various systems the set of
problems form a canon that was handed on from one system to
another through the scientific tradition.372 Ancient codes were school
texts to be used in training judicial officials. 373 If we hold this theory
we can see how the existence of a cultural activity in the field of law
has not been a Roman invention, and that the teaching of law was
much more exotic in Rome then elsewhere in the Mediterranean
366. See id.
367. See A. LEO OPPENHEIM, ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 243-56,272-75 (1964).
368. See WESTBROOK, supra note 365, at 3.
369. See id. at 4.
370. See id at 3. Even Westbrook is led by the prevailing bias of the conventional
discourse to state that the scribes' approach is "foreign to us", and that, in comparison
with Greeks, they "lacked analytical tools", and were "incapable of creating general
categories or of defining terms." Ia& Greek method is vertical Mesopotamian forced to
proceed horizontally.
371. On the teaching of law at Beyrouth and Constantinople, and Justinian's
compilation as a stop to juristic "development," see 1 F.H. LAWSON, MANY LAWS:
SELECTED ESSAYS 86 (1977).
372. See WESTBROOK, supra note 365, at 4.
373. And not as law library in courts polemica non importante per noi as well as
wisdom law the argument is the existence of a totally non-Roman cultural tradition on
law. See Lemche, supra note 349, at 23.
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basin. This is my tenet at the end of this section. In the next section,
I fully restate this understanding of Roman jurisprudence to
investigate what happened at the end of the Classical period, when
the major literature of jurists was produced.
F. Redaction and Deromanization
As we saw at the end of the previous section, my theory is that
there was a Mediterranean, non-Roman, and non-Greek, scholarly
tradition of legal studies, long before such studies started at Rome,
and that these legal studies were regularly organized into the scribal
schools. On the contrary a Roman jurisprudence was born outside
any stable organization as a response to major defects in the legal
process, and it was entrusted to members of the nobility. Thus I
conclude that Roman Law was not at all unique, and also that its
jurisprudential tradition has been based on schemes totally foreign to
the subsequent Western legal tradition.374 The Roman original
tradition of legal studies was not unique, it is not linked with, and so it
is not at the root of, what we still call the Western legal family. It was
a specific Roman product originated by specific Roman defects: the
lack of a judiciary, and the lack of law schools, since the Romans have
shown to have not been able to organize such institutions.
This peculiar Roman setting lasted throughout the Classical
period but with growing changes. At the beginning of the Principate,
the jurists were still coming from Roman families but pedigree no
longer counted. Labeo still was an important man having been in the
circle of Brutus' friends who conspired to kill Caesar, but he never
held a magistracy; Capito was but the grandson of a simple
centurion.375 Toward the end of the Classical period Julian was of a
respectable African family, Gaius himself must have been from some
Eastern province.376 Another major instance is Papinian, Aemilius
Papinianus, probably the most famous name in the whole history of
Roman jurisprudence,377 a man so influential that under the "Law of
Citations"378 his opinion tipped the balance if the authorities on either
side were equal in number. From our point of view, it is important to
notice that he was not a Roman. He is believed to have been a
Syrian,379 and indeed he was the brother-in-law of Emperor Severus,
whose second wife, Julia Domna, came from Hemesa, the actual
374. On the sharp difference between Roman jurists and later European civilians, see
SCHULZ, supra note 22, at 23.
375. See id. at 102.
376. See id. at 103.
377. See JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 391.
378. See infra note 395, and accompanying text.
379. JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 399 n.1.
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Horns. Ulpian, Domitius Ulpianus, was born in Tyre.380 He became
the emperor's chief legal adviser and held his office until 228 C.E.,
when he was murdered by mutinous guards. Among the three major
jurists of Rome, Papinian, Ulpian, and Paul only the latter is deemed
to have been a Roman. Later in the Dominate Tribonian, for
instance, the great chief compiler of the Digest came from Paphilia,
and Justinian himself was Iiiric.
From the time of Emperor Vespasian, a new type of jurist
appeared. These new jurists were constantly in office and
increasingly in receipt of salaries. The old conception of the
aristocratic jurist changed; they became men intimately connected
with government and ceased to be independent aristocrats to become
salaried officials. Many of them were not Romans. This trend is
conventionally labeled as the rise of the bureaucratic jurists.381 Still
later, in the period of Dominate, the jurists belonged to definite
professional groups, and, by the fourth century, advocates became
real lawyers educated in a law school, not merely in a school of
rhetoric382 as it was in Republican times.
Clearly something changed dramatically from the time of the first
jurists where there was no room in jurisprudence for non-Romans. I
maintain that at the beginning of the Great Crisis the setting was
becoming un-Roman and that they were engaged in a project of de-
Romanization of Roman Law in a much more multicultural society.
As we have seen, in 212 C.E., an edict known as the Antoninian
constitution had extended Roman citizenship to practically all free
inhabitants of the Empire.3 83 In theory, the prevailing doctrine of
personality of Law, according to which the law you use depends on
your personal status, should have meant that everyone thereafter had
to use Roman Law. I think that this major break in Roman history
must be fully appreciated for its deep consequences, even for Roman
jurisprudence. Up to this point, Roman Law was deemed to be the
law of Roman citizens, namely the law of the city of Rome and its
inhabitants. The "city" was a basic unit in the formation of the
Roman world.384 Different cities had different statuses, and of course
the city of Rome had a peculiar status in the Empire. Administrative
and political institutions of the Principate remained, for Roman Law
380. See hi at 402 (adding with a typical bias that this perhaps means "only" that his
family came from there).
381. See SCHULZ, supra note 22, at 103-04.
382. See i& at 267-77.
383. See ROBINSON ET AL, supra note 67, at 3.
384. See CITY AND COUNTRY IN THE ANCIENT WORLD (Andrew Wallace-Hadrill &
John Rich eds., 1991); see also J.H.W.G. LIEBESCHUETZ, ANTIOCH: CITY AND IMPERIAL
ADMINISTRATION IN THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE 167 (1972), for a peculiar study on the
transformation of civic institutions.
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had a peculiar attitude against renewal, modeled on the ancient
institutions governing the city. At the very beginning of the third
century crisis this basic unit collapsed. For the first time, the law of
the city of Rome and its citizens became the law of the Empire.
At first sight, this might have meant a spread of Roman pattern
throughout the land. But the story went the other way round, and we
may perceive it in the Romanists' accounts: because of the enormous
expansion in the number of persons subject to Roman Law and of the
political upheavals of the third century C.E. there was a widespread
desire for "simplification" and certainty. Therefore in the late third
century "elementary" legal books were published with this aim in
mind, and they came to be accepted as the working manuals of the
courts.?8 It is characteristic of the Romanists' bias to describe such
adaptation of Roman peculiar institutions to the newer cosmopolitan
society to be a "simplification" and to have adopted for this process
the unambiguously injurious label of "vulgarization" of the Roman
Law.386 In my theory, this process can better be described in terms of
"de-Romanization," meaning globalization of law in a multicultural
society where Rome lost its place of supremacy. As we have seen the
Empire was restored at the end of this century on totally different
conceptions and even the capital was removed from Rome.
It is important to notice that great jurists appeared in this period
because there was the need of a work conceived in Grand Style to
adapt out-moded Roman doctrines and institutions to a new setting.
The cosmopolitan nature of the Empire, and the breakdown of
national idiosyncrasies to introduce new conceptions is openly
acknowledged, 387 but it is not linked to the question why the great
jurists flourished at that time. I presume that my theory can give a
simple answer: legal efforts were geared by the attempt to break
down idiosyncrasies of earlier Roman Law, with all its magic and
rigidity, and to adapt it to a cosmopolitan multicultural society. If we
reason in terms of discontinuity, and since the writings of these jurists
are basically those inserted into Justinian's Compilation as a legacy to
Europe, we can see how Western law sprang not from a renewal of
the old idiosyncratic, city-based-and probably race-based-law
developed by the Roman genius, but from a major effort in
globalization and multiculturalism, brought about together by
Romans and non-Romans, who abandoned the old patterns of
jurisprudence for new paths.
We cannot perceive this achievement if we adopt the theory of
"vulgarization," which properly means that original Roman Law
385. ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 4.
386. Id.
387. See JoLowicz & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 419.
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changed because of contacts with other laws, but which put on a
flavor of "contamination" and impoverishment, as if there was
something to lose in leaving the magic of stipulatio or the pantomime
of mancipatio, or the necessity to use the magic verb "spondeo." We
can perceive the achievement only if we see it in the context of de-
Romanization of the Empire. If we adopt this theory it is not at all
trivial that some of the most prominent jurists were Africans or
Syrians. Such a circumstance is a minor, but peculiar feature of this
crucial period in the evolution of both Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East.
Later on the jurists disappeared. They became absorbed in the
administration but this fact, far from being a shame, was again an
achievement, coupled with public enforcement of rules and the
establishment of regular courts. The exoticism of the jurists
disappeared, in favor of a more regular profession, and the rising of
regular law schools. From the reign of Constantine on there are many
lawyers, but no more jurists in the traditional sense: "only"388 legal
advisers in the imperial service, law professors in the schools, and
advocates and judges in the courts. We witness the integration ofjurists within the machinery of government. This is because finally
the system evolved in a modem sense, abandoning the clanic and
post-clanic organization of justice. The jurists disappeared but a new
organized system of courts and schools emerged which we must
define, on the basis of accepted standards, and especially on the basis
of conservative views, as a better administration of justice.
From this account we can perceive how far the Late Empire
departed from the original Roman model in a multicultural context of
de-Romanization of the law. I maintain that this process was not an
organic evolution but a major break with the past marked by the
revolutionary times of the Great Crisis. This process is strictly linked
with the process of the redaction of Roman Law as it was transmitted
to the later European culture. Roman Law was received in Europe in
the form of a given number of texts, and it was upon these texts that
later lawyers worked out the European legal tradition.389 Of course
texts do not form by themselves. Redaction did take place after the
Great Crisis and there were persons who made up a finished version
of the Roman texts upon which we relied. What it is important to
point out is that the legacy of Roman Law to the later Western legal
culture has not been made up of the old purely Roman stuff, but of
the writings which emerged from the efforts in globalization. If we
cast the problem of redaction in these terms we can appreciate what
exactly Roman legacy has been. Redactors may select, may
388. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 48.
389. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 42.
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rearrange, may add necessary links, may insert explanations, and may
even contribute a narrative or expository framework of their own on
which to display the material. European legal culture has been
grounded upon the codes of the Dominate, and it was the
bureaucratic jurists of that period who composed the great
collections.39° the codex Gregorianus, Hermogenianus, Theodosianus,
which have been the major sources of the law in High Middle Ages in
the West, and above all Justinian's codification, which became the
standard book of the legal academic literature after the rising of
Universities in the twelfth century? 91
I think we must duly appreciate this work of redaction, and to see
why it did take place. Roman Law was put into codes, because the
codes represented a totally new mode for transmitting culture. It was
like the invention of the CD-ROM, and everything to be transmitted
had to be reproduced in the new format. Thus the problem of the
final redaction of legal texts is part of a more general question of the
transmission of the old culture as a legacy to later ages. We have
henceforth to explain what kind of new format the codes provided,
and what the meaning is for historical consciousness that this process
of redaction took place in the period of de-Romanization.
The old legal texts were made in rolls, especially in rolls of
papyri. "Papyrus paper was made from the reeds that grow in
profusion along the Nile, and a long process was needed to make a
sheet out of them. ' '392 "The finished sheets were pasted end to end
and rolled up, twenty to a roll. '393 Their mortal enemy was moisture;
saved from that they can lie in the sand or in a tomb for thousands of
years. Indeed many papyri survived only in Egypt because of its
climate. This kind of paper was the most economic form of writing
material, much cheaper than parchment or vellum, but from Spain to
Syria none of these rolls have survived. Damp has been fatal, with
the exception of Middle and Upper Egypt.
The invention of the Codex created the book instead of the
rolls 394 Codex is a Latin word simply meaning a bound volume of
sheets of parchment or paper. The new method allowed for a much
longer and safer transmission of collected writings. It started in the
late second century but became dominant in the fourth century C.E.,
when the compilation of the Law Codes was made in the new setting
of globalization, and the name "code" was applied to law collections.
390. See SCHULZ, supra note 22, at 267.
391. See ROBINSON ET AL., supra note 67, at 42.
392. LIONEL CASSON, ANCIENT TRADE AND SOCIETY 155-57 (1984).
393. Id at 156.
394. See E.G. TURNER, THE TYPOLOGY OF THE EARLY CODEX (1977); C.H. Roberts,
The Codex, 40 PROC. OF THE BRrr. ACAD. 169,173 (1954).
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As we said it was like inventing the mobile press or the CD-ROM
which preserved the old wisdom in received works. What we have is
to a large extent what was saved in the codes.
Of course this was a great work of selection and exclusion. It was
a conscious effort of restatement of the old. It was a process of
legitimization of authorities. In the Theodosian Code we find indeed
an enactment, from 426 C.E., commonly known as the Law of
Citations395 specifying which writings could be cited as authorities,
excluding all the others. This code established a rule for the practice
which would remain in force until the time of Justinian,396 whose
collection was designed to supplant all earlier laws and legal
writings.397 Justinian's compilation is a real "new beginning" and it
was conceived to be. From this standpoint it shares the nature of a
"Constitution" of the so-called Roman legacy, but it was indeed quite
un-Roman. The project of re-writing of the past in the "books," was a
real exercise in deciding who was invested with the authority to
speak, and who was deprived of it, and as such it was crucial in the
new setting of the Eastern Empire. The legacy of the "Roman" legal
world has been a legacy of "Eastern" minds.
Indeed for its later use in the European law schools the most
important of collections resulted from the Digest redaction39 8
performed by the non-Roman Tribonian, under the non-Roman
Emperor Justinian, in a totally Eastern setting. It is such a work that
gave us the "book of our tradition," and it is quite clear that this
tradition was no longer the original Roman one. Thus my final
argument is that what has been called for centuries the Roman Law
legacy was indeed the final work of a redaction led by non-Roman
lawyers in a non-Roman setting, occurring after the Great Crisis, in
the period of de-Romanization of the Empire. The denial of this
redaction process, and of the fact that it finally took place among non-
Romans, is a pure ideological account falsifying our historical
consciousness and our indebtedness to the non-Romans.
Conclusion: "The Closing of the Western Mind"
From the standpoint of law-in-history this paper shows that
Roman Law has no claim to supremacy in the ancient world. That
law was just as magic and exotic as others. Besides, the Roman
machinery of justice was quite defective, and the distinctive unfolding
of Roman legal science and profession was not so peculiar, due as it
395. See ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 20.
396. See JOLOwICz & NICHOLAS, supra note 126, at 452-53.
397. See ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 20.
398. See DAVID PUGSLEY, JUSTINIAN'S DIGEST AND THE COMPILERS (Tiverton,
Devon, U.K., Maslands Ltd. 1995).
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was to major defects in the legal machinery. In the end, it was only
after the third century crisis that Roman Law evolved toward modem
standards. In contrast, many traits of Egyptian and Semitic laws were
probably borrowed because they proved to be "superior" to their
then-existing Roman alternatives.
The myth of Roman supremacy in the field of law was
manufactured by the biases of nineteenth-century historicism, which
does not approach our present standards, and which can no longer be
relied upon. This kind of historicism was contradictory because the
Western indebtedness toward non-Western civilizations was denied,
and declassed as "vulgarization," "contamination" or "distortion" of
Roman elements, when on the contrary it amounted to a series of
contributions leading to improvement. This myth has been the
offspring of reactionary cultural politics, and it cannot be regarded as
sound scholarship, based as it was on a specific logic of exclusion of
non-Indo-European imports. The conventional framework was
politicized against possible African-Semitic contributions. Even from
a conservative point of view, we should claim the adoption of a more
neutral framework. I do not think that there is much politics in what I
have said, whereas there is a lot of "denied" politics informing the
traditional approach.
The rejection of the conventional unsound picture has important
consequences for the historical consciousness of the Western legal
tradition as such, which is to be seen more as a multicultural
enterprise than as the peculiar evolution of one culture. And which
perhaps no longer should be viewed as a single continuous tradition.
This implies that the projects of governance based on the
conventional picture are untenable, and must be abandoned.
Traditions are often a substitute for conscious projects: the need for
them and their invention is the symptom of a malaise, as it is the
denial of "contaminations" by "other" races and cultures. I think that
this malaise derives from the big lie of Roman jurisprudence. Thus
we have to depict a new outlook of our past, blurring and maybe
reversing the received distinction between an "us" and a "them."
Radicalism leads us to new needs, and what we need now is a new
consciousness.
March 2000] BLACK GAIUS
* * *
